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Abstract 
One of the most pressing questions facing both corporate scholars 
and businesspeople today is how corporate directors can be made 
accountable. Before addressing this issue, however, it seems important 
to consider two antecedent questions: To whom should directors be 
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Contemporary corporate scholarship often starts from a 
“shareholder primacy” perspective that holds that directors of public 
corporations ought to be accountable only to the shareholders, and 
ought to be accountable only for maximizing the value of the 
shareholders’ shares. This perspective rests on the conventional 
contractarian assumption that the shareholders are the sole residual 
claimants and risk bearers in a public firm. More recent work in 
economics suggests, however, that this assumption is false. In 
particular, options theory and the growing literature on the 
contracting difficulties associated with firm-specific investment both 
support the claim that a wide variety of groups are likely to bear 
significant residual risk and enjoy significant residual claims on firm 
earnings. These groups include not only shareholders, but also 
creditors, managers, and employees. Thus economic efficiency may be 
best served not by requiring corporate directors to focus solely on 
shareholders’ interests, but by requiring them instead to maximize the 
sum of all the interests held by all the groups that bear residual risks 
and hold residual claims. 
In accord with this view, we argue that corporate directors ought 
to be viewed not as “agents” who serve only the shareholders, but as 
“mediating hierarchs” who enjoy ultimate control over the firm’s 
assets and outputs and who are charged with the task of balancing the 
sometimes-conflicting claims and interests of the many different 
groups that bear residual risk and have residual claims on the firm. 
This mediating model of the board’s role offers to explain a variety of 
important doctrines in U.S. law that preserve director autonomy and 
insulate the board from the command and control of the shareholders 
or indeed any other group. At the same time, the mediating model 
raises the question of why directors who are largely insulated from 
outside pressures should be expected to do a good job of running the 
firm. We suggest that answers to this question are available, but only 
if we are willing to look beyond the homo economicus model of 
rationally selfish behavior commonly employed in economic analysis 
and to consider as well the extensive empirical evidence in the social 
sciences literature on the phenomenon of intrinisically trustworthy, 
other-regarding behavior. We briefly explore how this literature both 
supports the claim that directors may behave trustworthily even when 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
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they do not have explicit incentives to do so, and suggests some of the 
circumstances that are likely to promote accountable director 
behavior. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public corporations control trillions of dollars of assets, employ millions 
of people, and produce many of the goods and services we consume in our 
daily lives. Public corporations, in turn, are controlled by boards of 
directors.1 The issue of director accountability, as a result, is one of 
tremendous importance. But before attempting to address the question of 
how directors can be held accountable, it seems sensible to consider two 
antecedent questions: to whom should directors be accountable; and, for 
what? 
For nearly as long as the public corporation has existed, scholars, 
practitioners, and policymakers have debated the job description and legal 
obligations of corporate directors.2 But to anyone who entered the debate in 
the last decade and read only the dominant academic commentary or 
informal discussions in the business press, the issue might appear 
conclusively settled in favor of the following two propositions: first, the 
board’s only job is to faithfully serve the interests of the firm’s shareholders; 
and second, the best way to do this is to maximize the value of the 
company’s shares.3 
The idea that shareholders alone are the raison d’être of the corporation 
dominates contemporary discussion of corporate governance, both outside 
and, in many cases, inside the boardroom. Yet the “shareholder primacy” 
 
 
 1. Since the early twentieth century, both the common law and state codes have required that 
boards of directors manage publicly held corporations. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: 
A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 348-49 & 
n.7 (1991). In contrast, many states allow close corporations to be run directly by their shareholders. 
See infra note 86.  
 2. A classic example can be found in the early debate between Professors Adolf Berle and 
Merrick Dodd.  See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
(1932). 
 3. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 & nn.15-16 (1999) (reviewing extensive literature asserting or assuming that 
directors should serve shareholders exclusively). This view is so dominant in recent scholarship that 
two prominent legal scholars recently proclaimed that the entire world is converging on the belief that 
the best means to maximize social welfare is “to make corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001). The authors appear 
to be using the term “managers” in its broadest sense, meaning managers and directors. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claim seems at odds with a variety of important characteristics of U.S. 
corporate law. Despite the emphasis legal theorists have given shareholder 
primacy in recent years, corporate law itself does not obligate directors to do 
what the shareholders tell them to do. Nor does corporate law compel the 
board to maximize share value.4 To the contrary, directors of public 
corporations enjoy a remarkable degree of freedom from shareholder 
command and control. Similarly, the law grants directors wide discretion to 
consider the interests of other corporate participants in their decision 
making—even when this adversely affects the value of the stockholders’ 
shares.5 If directors are really supposed to run firms solely for the benefit of 
shareholders, how can we explain this pattern? Why does corporate law 
shield directors from shareholder control and protect them from shareholder 
lawsuits when they pursue corporate strategies that benefit other groups, 
including employees, managers, and creditors, at the shareholders’ expense? 
The answer, we argue here, may lie in recognizing that shareholder 
primacy is both positively and normatively incorrect, at least in the extreme 
rhetorical form in which it is most commonly expressed. Corporate law does 
not—nor should it—require directors to maximize the value of the 
company’s common stock. To the contrary, it grants—and should grant—the 
directors of public companies enormous freedom to decide where and how 
the firm ought to allocate its scarce resources. This arrangement does not 
preclude corporate directors from using their autonomy to pursue a higher 
stock price. However, it also does not prevent directors from using the firm’s 
resources instead to benefit managers, employees, or even the local 
community. 
To explain why it may be desirable that directors enjoy this degree of 
discretion, we begin by reexamining the theoretical foundations of the 
shareholder primacy claim. The notion that directors ought to focus solely on 
 
 
 4. As a result, some scholars have proposed changing the law to require directors to follow 
shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277 (1990) (arguing that directors’ fiduciary duties should be 
interpreted to require them explicitly to maximize share value, rather than the less precise requirement 
in current law that directors’ actions should serve the interests of the corporation and its shareholders). 
See also MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 116-21 app. 3-1 (1995) (listing changes in law and corporate 
governance proposed in the late 1980s and early 1990s for the purpose of enhancing shareholder 
power and influence). 
 5. In recent years, a majority of the states have adopted “other constituency statutes” that 
expressly authorize corporate boards to consider the interests of nonshareholder groups in making their 
decisions. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992). Although no constituency statute exists 
in Delaware, Delaware case law generally grants directors discretion to consider nonshareholder 
interests. See infra text accompanying notes 64-74. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
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maximizing the market value of the shareholders’ interest in the firm rests on 
a prominent idea in economic theory that we refer to as the “principal-agent 
model” of the firm.6 According to the principal-agent model, the 
shareholders in a public corporation are the true owners of the firm or, in 
more sophisticated accounts, its residual claimants. Directors are mere agents 
whom the shareholders hire to run the firm because they lack the skill, time, 
or inclination to run it themselves. The obvious corollary is that, provided the 
firm does not violate the law, directors ought to serve and be accountable 
only to the shareholders. 
Ironically, even as the rhetoric of shareholder primacy becomes 
increasingly influential in academic and corporate circles, contemporary 
work in theoretical and empirical economics has begun to suggest that we 
should question the validity of the principal-agent model as a description of 
the shareholder-director relationship. A full review of the relevant legal and 
economic literature lies well beyond the scope of our inquiry. Rather, we 
offer an introduction to some of the recent work in this area and explore the 
resulting implications for the shareholder primacy claim. In this process, we 
weave together a number of ideas discussed in greater detail in our prior 
articles, and also explore new ideas as well.7  
We begin by considering why a rule of strict shareholder primacy might 
at times be inefficient. In particular, we examine how options theory, 
contemporary work on implicit contracting, and contemporary work on firm-
specific investment all suggest that a strict rule of shareholder primacy 
would, in some fairly common situations, require directors to pursue 
strategies that actually reduce the economic value of the firm. 
 
 
 6. One might go further and presume that maximizing the economic value of the shareholder’s 
interest means maximizing today’s share price. This extreme form of shareholder primacy relies on a 
second economic idea known as the “efficient capital markets hypothesis” (ECMH). As commonly 
understood, the ECMH predicts that the market price of a publicly traded security should incorporate 
all available public information relevant to estimating that security’s future risks and returns. See, e.g., 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991) (defining the “market 
efficiency hypothesis” as “the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all available 
information”). Sometimes this is interpreted to mean that the market should be “fundamental value 
efficient,” meaning that absent contradictory private information, today’s stock price represents the 
best possible estimate of the long-term, as well as the short-term, value of the shareholders’ stock. This 
assumption about market prices refines the prescription that directors should serve only shareholders to 
a more precise prescription that, to serve shareholders, directors should always try to maximize today’s 
share value. See Lynn A. Stout, Stock Prices and Social Wealth 3-4, 26-36 (Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper Series No. 301 (2000) (discussing and critiquing this notion), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/program/olin_center. 
 7. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 4; Blair & Stout, supra note 3; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2001); Stout, supra note 6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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We then present an alternative model of directors’ duties that builds on 
this insight. This alternative model relies on the idea that the primary 
economic function of directors in public corporations may not be to act as 
shareholders’ agents but, instead, to serve as “mediating hierarchs” charged 
with balancing the sometimes competing interests of a variety of groups that 
participate in public corporations. We argue that the mediating board can 
serve efficiency by providing a second best solution to the complex team 
production contracting problem that often arises among creditors, employees, 
managers, majority and minority shareholders, and other groups that bear 
risks or make firm-specific investments in public companies. We also argue 
that the mediating hierarchy model provides a better explanation for many 
important features of contemporary corporate law than the principal-agent 
model does.  
To the extent it reflects the reality of the modern public corporation, the 
mediating hierarchy model carries important implications for our 
understanding of: (1) what the law requires of directors, (2) whose interests 
boards should serve, and (3) how boards actually work. In particular, the 
mediating hierarchy model emphasizes the importance of ensuring that 
directors enjoy a wide range of discretion in determining whether corporate 
resources should be used to benefit shareholders or to benefit some other set 
of participants (such as creditors, employees, or upper-level managers) who 
bear risk or make firm-specific investments in the enterprise. A necessary 
corollary is that none of these groups—including shareholders—should be 
able to exercise direct control over the board. 
We conclude by addressing the obvious problem raised by such an 
approach: namely, why should a mediating board that is largely insulated 
from the shareholders’ control (indeed from anyone’s control) do a good job? 
We suggest that answers to this question are readily available—if we are 
willing to look beyond the economic literature and consider the extensive 
work that has been done in other branches of the social sciences on the 
phenomenon of intrinsic trustworthiness. This work suggests that in a variety 
of circumstances, directors can be counted upon to behave trustworthily in 
mediating among the interests of the many different groups that bear risks 
and make firm-specific investments in public firms, even when they will 
suffer no obvious punishment if they fail to do so. Director trustworthiness 
largely depends, however, on a variety of social signals and variables—
signals and variables that commentators who adopt the principal-agent model 
tend to overlook. If we want to promote director accountability, it is essential 
that these social factors support, rather than undermine, directors’ roles as 
trusted mediators.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
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II. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL AND THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR 
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
In the business press, the argument for shareholder primacy often begins 
with the simple assertion that shareholders are the true owners of the 
corporation.8 For example, in his famous 1970 New York Times essay 
declaring that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits,” 
Milton Friedman referred to shareholders as “owners” and wrote of corporate 
assets as if they belonged to shareholders.9 Commentators who use the 
rhetoric of property rights to justify shareholder primacy bring a strong moral 
overtone to their arguments, implying that any use of corporate assets that 
does not directly enhance shareholder wealth is a form of theft. Yet from a 
logical perspective, the naked claim that shareholders own the corporation is 
just that—a naked claim. As a legal matter, shareholders neither control how 
the firm’s assets are used, nor are entitled to receive dividends or to make any 
other direct claim on the firm’s earnings.10 
 
 
 8. The idea that business corporations should exist solely to make profits for shareholders may 
have historically originated in the ultra vires argument that corporations, which originally were 
chartered for specific purposes deemed to be in the public interest, did not have legal authority to 
engage in activities not specified in their corporate charters. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 91-92 (4th ed. 1998). Even after general purpose corporate charters 
became widely available, corporations could not change their charter or the fundamental nature of their 
business without the unanimous approval of their “members” or shareholders. Id. at 371-72. These 
antecedents may help explain the modern tendency to describe shareholders as “owners”. 
Contemporary corporate law, however, treats corporations as separate and autonomous legal persons 
whose boards of directors have authority to make decisions and take action without shareholder 
approval. 
 9. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26 (“[A] corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the 
business.”) (emphasis added). Friedman’s argument addressed whether corporations should be 
“socially responsible” or simply pursue profits. Id. Friedman believed it was dangerous to permit 
corporate managers and directors, who are not elected by and accountable to ordinary voters and 
members of society, to make unchallengeable decisions about what they believed to be “socially 
responsible” and to direct the sometimes vast resources under their control toward those ends. Id. This 
potential problem is closely related to the one we address in our argument here, and in Parts IV and V 
we take it up more directly when we discuss constraints on directors’ behavior. See infra text 
accompanying notes 92-94, 101-08. 
 10. Shareholders neither own nor have the right to control corporate assets. Bryan v. Aiken, 86 
A. 674, 684 (Del. Ch. 1913) (“The [stockholder] does not, and cannot own the property of the 
corporation, or even the earnings, until they are declared in the form of dividends.”). Moreover, the 
legal rights shareholders do enjoy (for example, the right to elect directors, to veto certain corporate 
transactions by majority voting, to offer proposals that the directors are often free to ignore, to receive 
dividends if and when the directors declare them) look very different from the rights enjoyed by those 
who own physical assets such as land or jewelry. The assertion that shareholders are “owners” of 
corporations functions, as a result, is primarily a rhetorical device designed to trump all other 
arguments. It is not, by itself, a serious legal or economic argument.  
 Ironically, Friedman’s essay appeared just as other contemporary scholars were explaining why 
shareholders in publicly traded firms could not be said to “own” corporate assets in any traditional 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The more serious argument for shareholder primacy can be found in the 
work of so-called “contractarian” corporate scholars, as summarized and 
explored in Easterbrook and Fischel’s influential book The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law.11 Contractarian scholars argue that a corporation 
is best understood as a “nexus of contracts” entered into by numerous 
corporate participants who hope to profit from contributing resources to and 
working together in a productive enterprise. These participants enter into 
explicit and implicit contracts with the firm that define what they are 
supposed to contribute and what they are supposed to receive in return. 
According to most contractarians, nonshareholder participants in the firm 
(including bondholders, managers, and employees) demand contracts that 
require them to be fully compensated out of any revenues earned by the 
enterprise before any payments can be made to shareholders. Shareholders 
are thus said to be the firm’s “residual claimants.” 
As residual claimants, shareholder’s fortunes are clearly tied to the firm. 
If profits increase, the shareholders benefit from this bounty; if profits 
decline, shareholders feel the loss. Shareholders therefore supposedly have 
the most need for, and are willing to pay the highest price for, control over 
the corporation. (Everyone else’s returns supposedly are protected—and 
limited—by the terms of their contracts.) According to this theory, 
shareholders get to elect corporate directors because they implicitly 
bargained for this right, accepting a higher degree of risk than other groups in 
exchange for it. Shareholders, accordingly, should be viewed as the 
principals in the firm, and the directors who actually control the enterprise 
should be viewed as mere agents whom the shareholders employ to serve 
their interests. Consequently, directors should faithfully attend to the interests 
of the shareholders—and not to the interests of any other group—in carrying 
out their duties. Put in legal terms, directors owe their fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders alone. 
III. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
Taken at face value, the principal-agent model of the firm implies that 
shareholder primacy is desirable. But does the principal-agent model really 
 
 
sense of that word. See, e.g., DOW VOTAW, MODERN CORPORATIONS 96-97 (1965) (noting that “the 
corporate concept divides this bundle of rights [associated with “property”] into several pieces” and 
allocates them to different participants). 
 11. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW (1991). A vast literature, both preceding and succeeding this work, further develops and analyzes 
the basic argument and related ones as well. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 258-65 (citing some of 
the literature). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
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describe the public corporation? We believe not. In recent years, a number of 
scholars have explored economic arguments that suggest the principal-agent 
model may be seriously flawed and that a strict rule of shareholder primacy 
could be inefficient.12 We review some of those arguments briefly below.  
A. How Options Theory Undermines the Principal-Agent Model 
Options theory is a relatively recent development in finance theory that 
fatally undermines the idea that shareholders, or any other group, are the sole 
residual claimants of a public corporation.13 This is because options theory 
demonstrates that the value of all financial securities can be decomposed into 
two parts: (1) the value due to the expected stream of income the security 
provides, and (2) the value of the “options” or “futures” features in the 
security.14 For example, basic corporate debt and equity securities can be 
 
 
 12. See BLAIR, supra note 4, at 202-34 (arguing that shareholders are not the “owners” of 
corporations in any traditional legal or economic sense of the word and not the only residual 
claimants); Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 265-76 (arguing against shareholder primacy using team 
production analysis). See also Stout, supra note 6, at 5-15 (arguing that the fundamental value version 
of the ECMH relies on the unrealistic assumption that investors share identical expectations about the 
future and that recent empirical work undermines even the informational efficiency version of the 
theory by suggesting that stock prices respond to some forms of public information quite slowly). For 
this reason and others, stock prices cannot be relied upon as a measure of the value created by 
corporations. Id. 
 13. Technically, traditional finance theory says a security’s value is determined by both the 
stream of income, and the “beta” or nondiversifiable risk associated with that stream of income. See 
generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 49-67 
(4th ed. 1991). Modern options theory adds that conditional claims associated with the security also 
affect its value. The first essays modeling precisely how financial options should be valued were 
published in the 1970s. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (developing a mathematical model for pricing financial 
options); Robert Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1973) (same). 
Merton and Scholes received the Nobel Prize in Economics for their work on options theory in 1997. 
 14. Options come in two basic varieties. A “call option” gives the buyer the legal right to 
purchase the underlying asset during some fixed interval, or at some fixed time, for a fixed price. The 
option seller conveys this right in exchange for an upfront payment. A “put option” gives the option 
buyer the right to sell the underlying asset at a fixed price during some fixed interval, or at some fixed 
time, again in return for an upfront payment. Related to options are futures contracts, which, rather 
than giving one of the parties a right to buy or sell at a set price some time in the future, requires the 
seller to transfer the asset to the buyer on some future date at a price specified in the present contract. 
Options and futures contracts are both derivative securities (that is, their value is derived from some 
underlying asset). Options are more important to corporate law than are futures, so we confine our 
present discussion to options. See Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 
GA. L. REV. 599, 604 (2000) (“Options are more important than forwards in corporate law.”).  
Partnoy’s essay provides an excellent introduction to the implications of options theory for corporate 
law. Other outstanding works on related subjects include: G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000); Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of 
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1991); and 
Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reconceptualized as contracts between buyers and sellers of options.15 
Imagine an entrepreneur who holds one hundred percent of the equity 
shares of a corporation and decides that the firm should borrow money by 
issuing a twenty million dollar bond to an institutional investor. The bond is 
due in two years with no interest payments required in the interim (it is a 
“zero-coupon” bond), and the firm is otherwise debt-free. The economic 
relationship between the entrepreneur and the institutional investor can be 
described in the following terms: the entrepreneur “owns” the right to the net 
cash flow generated by the original unleveraged firm. In issuing the bond, 
however, the entrepreneur bought a put option (a right to sell his interest in 
the firm) from the institution. If the present value of the firm’s cash flow 
drops to less than twenty million dollars by the date the bond is due, which is 
equivalent to the option “exercise date”, then the entrepreneur can require the 
institution to “buy” his claims to the cash flow of the firm for twenty million 
dollars by simply defaulting on the loan and letting the institution take 
possession. The entrepreneur can then walk away without further obligation. 
Alternatively, the relationship could be described as one in which the 
institution “owns” the right to the cash flow from the unleveraged version of 
the firm, but sold a call option to the entrepreneur. In other words, the 
entrepreneur has the right to buy the claim to all the firm’s cash flow from 
the institution on the exercise date for twenty million dollars. If the present 
value of the firm’s cash flow exceeds twenty million dollars on the date the 
bond is due, the entrepreneur can be expected to “exercise” his call option by 
paying off the loan. If, however, the present value of the cash flow is less 
than twenty million dollars, the entrepreneur can choose not to exercise the 
option and cede his interest in the firm to the institution.  
From the standpoint of the financial claims and risk being borne by the 
two parties, these two ways of understanding their relationship are exactly 
equivalent. This equivalency, in turn, reveals the difficulty in economic 
theory of trying to establish a claim of special status for shareholders as a 
result of any supposed property or ownership interest. It is equally sensible to 
describe either the stockholder or the institutional bondholder as the firm’s 
true “owner”, with the other party holding some sort of contingent claim. 
Options theory destroys any notion that shareholders can be uniquely 
 
 
 15. We use the word “option” in its economic rather than its legal sense. In other words, we do 
not intend to suggest that corporate stocks and bonds are the same types of securities as the short-term 
options contracts commonly traded on securities and commodities exchanges. The latter are contracts 
between third parties (essentially zero-sum bets on the future price of an underlying corporate stock) 
and not claims against the corporation itself. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
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described, in economic terms at least, as “owners” of corporations.16 
Options theory also makes clear that shareholders are rarely the only 
corporate participants who have a stake in how the firm is managed. An 
increase in risk increases the value of an option to its holder, at the expense 
of the option holder’s counterparty, the option “writer”.17 In the context of a 
corporation, this means that committing the firm to a riskier strategy will 
increase the value of the shareholders’ interest in the firm while reducing the 
value of the debtholders’ interest. Shareholders, like call option holders, 
capture the upside potential of risky projects, while debtholders, who are in a 
position similar to sellers of put options, may bear all or most of the 
downside risk.18 This last point is important, for it implies that requiring 
directors to maximize share value will not necessarily maximize the total 
value of the corporation. In fact, the firm’s economic value can be reduced 
by encouraging directors to accept inefficient risks that increase the value of 
the shareholders’ interest while simultaneously decreasing the value of the 
debtholders’ interest by an even greater amount.19 
Consider the example of a firm that has fifteen million dollars in debt and 
twenty million dollars in assets. The directors of the firm then evaluate a 
 
 
 16. Both statutory and case law generally fail to distinguish between debt and equity on the basis 
of clear and identifiable characteristics that separate the two, except for purposes of determining 
whether the payments to the security holders are considered deductible business expenses for tax 
purposes. See William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A 
Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971). A few state statutes simply define 
“shares” as “the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided.” See, e.g., CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 184 (West 2001). And a few court opinions simply assert that equity holders have a 
different kind of interest in the firm, one that is a “property interest” or “proprietary interest.” See, e.g., 
Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (reasoning that holders of convertible securities are 
not owed fiduciary duties because they have a “mere expectancy interest” and not “an existing 
property right or equitable interest”). These opinions, however, fail to explain what, other than their 
label, distinguishes a “property interest” from other kinds of financial interests in corporations. 
 17. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT 245 (1993) (applying options perspective to explain basic conflicts of interest between 
debtholders and equity holders); STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 582-86 (4th ed. 
1996) (noting that the value of options depends on variability of underlying security). 
 18. The notion that share value can be enhanced by increasing risk has been long understood 
implicitly by legal theorists, and this idea influences the structure of bankruptcy law. The development 
of formal options theory, however, confirmed this view, and helped to enhance its profile among 
corporate law scholars in recent years. See Partnoy, supra note 14, at 603; see also Hu, supra note 4, at 
295-300 (noting that corporate health and shareholder welfare are not the same, that classic fiduciary 
principles tend to encourage managers to focus on reducing the total risk affecting the firm rather than 
just nondiversifiable risk, and that this approach protects other firm participants but is too risk averse 
from the shareholders’ perspective). 
 19. See Partnoy, supra note 14, at 600 (observing more broadly that “[f]or the study and practice 
of corporate law, the consequences of the derivatives revolution are devastating . . . . Some basic 
corporate law concepts, including the notion that managers should owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders, rest on a shaky foundation at best”). 
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project that has a fifty percent chance of producing six million dollars in 
profits, and a fifty percent chance of producing a twelve million dollar loss. 
The project accordingly has a negative expected value of minus three million 
dollars. Although pursuing the project would reduce the economic value of 
the firm as a whole, under a rule of strict shareholder primacy, the directors 
of the company should proceed with the project. After all, viewed strictly 
from the shareholders’ perspective, the project actually has a positive net 
expected value of half a million dollars.20  
B. How Recognizing Firm-Specific Investment Undermines the Principal-
Agent Model  
By revealing how debtholders, like shareholders, bear some residual risk 
in the firm, options theory demonstrates an important reason why shareholder 
primacy can be inefficient. But a strict rule of shareholder primacy carries 
even more potential for inefficiency than the above example suggests. This is 
because shareholders and debtholders are not the only groups whose fortunes 
are influenced by directors’ decisions. To the contrary, a number of other 
groups can also be “residual claimants” of the public firm, in the sense that 
the value of these participants’ economic claims on the firm depend, 
explicitly or implicitly, on the firm’s overall performance.21 
The point is perhaps most obvious in the case of managers and 
employees. Managers and employees frequently make firm-specific 
investments that give them a stake in the economic health of the firm. For 
example, employees and managers often make large investments in firm-
specific human capital, such as knowledge, skills, and relationships, that are 
of far greater value to their present employer than to any other.22 Employees 
 
 
 20. The shareholders have a fifty percent chance of enjoying a six million dollar increase in the 
value of their equity, and because any loss over five million dollars would be borne by the debtholders, 
a fifty percent chance of only a five million dollar loss.  
 21. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 4, at 229-34; Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 250, 275-78; Gulati 
et al., supra note 14, at 918-29; Bernard S. Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants 7 (May 
2001) (working paper, on file with authors). 
 22. Employees laid off through plant closings or other corporate restructuring activity not only 
suffer loss of income while they search for a new job, but also typically take a cut in pay of at least ten 
to fifteen percent at their next job. See BLAIR, supra note 4, at 265-66 (discussing this phenomenon 
and citing empirical literature). As a rule, the longer the employee’s employment with the previous 
firm, the larger the wage loss. For employees who have been at their previous job for ten years or 
more, losses generally exceed twenty-five percent. See generally Lori G. Kletzer, Job Displacement, 
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115 (1998) (presenting a comprehensive survey of empirical findings on economic 
losses due to job displacement). Though employees may eventually catch up in absolute terms to their 
former wage levels, the evidence suggests that, on average, these losses are, for practical purposes, 
never made up in relative terms. See Charles L. Schultze, Has Job Security Eroded for American 
Workers?, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 28, 56-59 
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and managers may also make firm-specific investments by putting forth extra 
effort to benefit the firm.23 Employees and managers usually make these 
investments because they believe that in the long run, the firm will reward 
them with raises, promotions, and job security. However, while the belief 
that they will share in the firm’s success can spur greater effort and loyalty 
from managers and employees, such an expectation is often legally 
unenforceable.24 Managers and employees, as a result, run the risk that a 
reversal in the firm’s fortunes might prevent the firm from ever giving them 
their expected raises and promotions. Indeed, if a risky corporate strategy 
ends badly, managers and employees might even be laid off, in which case 
they would lose their firm-specific human capital without any compensation. 
Employees and managers are also vulnerable to the possibility that a board of 
directors concerned only with shareholder interests might deliberately renege 
on their implicit commitments to employees.25  
Consider the example of a firm that induced its employees to make 
significant investments in firm-specific human capital through a legally 
unenforceable understanding that if the firm does well, the employees will 
receive regular raises. Assume the firm has annual sales of $110 and pays 
annual wages totaling $100, so that annual net earnings are $10. These 
earnings are distributed as dividends to the shareholders each year and the 
market capitalization of the firm’s equity is $100, implying a price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio of ten to one. Assume also that the employees of the firm receive 
a wage premium of $10 (somewhat more than ten percent) more than they 
could expect to earn if they were forced to find other employment. The 
premium is significant, because it implies that the firm could take advantage 
of the employees’ firm-specific human capital investments by lowering its 
total annual wages from $100 to $90, and the employees would still be better 
 
 
(Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE NEW RELATIONSHIP]. 
 23. Such extracontractual investments are “firm-specific” in the sense that the employee cannot 
withdraw them and expect to be rewarded for them primarily by her present employer. 
 24. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, 
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1543-47 (1981) (discussing the reasons for contract 
incompleteness); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1763-65 (1989) (discussing contract incompleteness). See also infra text and notes 34-38 
(discussing the difficulties of contracting in complex corporate production). 
 25. Even directors who are commited to shareholder primacy must be concerned about their 
firm’s reputation in a particular labor market if they expect the firm to hire new employees from that 
market in the future. Reputational concerns alone, however, cannot deter opportunistic behavior in 
“endgame” situtations where an employer either does not expect to hire new employees in the future or 
expects to hire them from a different market. Reputational constraints are thus greatly weakened when 
corporations are rapidly merging, spinning off, restructuring, moving production abroad, or otherwise 
transforming their identities. 
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off staying with their present employer.26 If the board in fact lowered wages 
to $90, this reduction in employee wages would trigger a one hundred 
percent increase in net earnings. If the firm’s P/E ratio stayed constant the 
result would be to double the value of the shareholders’ interest in the firm—
at the employees’ expense. 
As this example illustrates, managers and employees of public firms also 
can have an economic interest (sometimes a very large economic interest) in 
how the directors of a public corporation decide to run the firm. Depending 
on the circumstances, similar arguments can be made about suppliers, 
contractors, customers, and even communities–indeed, any group that makes 
itself vulnerable by making investments specific to the corporation that are 
not completely protected by an enforceable contract. 
C. On the Puzzling Persistence of Shareholder Primacy 
An economic analysis of the public corporation in light of options theory 
and the phenomenon of firm-specific investment suggests that a strict rule of 
shareholder primacy can be inefficient. Focusing solely on increasing the 
value of the shareholders’ interests can drive corporate directors to adopt 
strategies that decrease the aggregate value of the firm, once the economic 
value of nonshareholder interests is taken into account.  
It seems curious, therefore, that contractarian corporate scholars (who 
generally favor efficiency as a policy goal) so frequently adopt shareholder 
primacy as if it were the only logical outcome of contractarian analysis. One 
possible explanation may be that the contractarian fondness for shareholder 
primacy is the legacy of an earlier economic literature that implicitly 
assumed that the relationship between shareholders and corporate managers 
was a principal-agent relationship.27 Subsequent legal scholarship built on 
this early foundation without stopping to consider whether principal-agent 
analysis really offered an accurate description of the legal status of 
shareholders or the economic realities of the firm. But as we explore below, 
one can adopt a contractarian analysis and still reject the claim that the 
 
 
 26. As an empirical matter, a ten percent premium seems quite realistic. See sources cited supra 
note 22 (discussing how senior employees who lose their jobs through no fault of their own usually 
suffer significant decreases in lifetime earnings). 
 27. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). These theoretical 
essays analyzed corporations in terms of a principle-agent analysis, thereby providing the basis for 
early contractarian corporate law scholarship.  
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principal-agent contract is the sole, or even primary, economic problem 
addressed by corporate law.28 
A second possible explanation may lie in corporate scholars’ habit of 
looking at corporations through the lens of accounting. Income statements 
provide periodic snapshots of the flow of certain types of assets in and out of 
a firm over a specific period of time, and balance sheets capture a measure of 
the value of certain types of assets and liabilities at the end of that period. 
Ostensibly, these reports offer insight into the “net worth” of the 
corporation–the amount that would be available to pay out to the 
shareholders if the firm could instantaneously wind up its business, liquidate 
its assets, and pay off all its senior contractual obligations to employees, 
debtholders, and so forth. Accounting, however, notoriously fails to measure 
a wide range of matters that are relevant to valuing the corporation as a going 
concern.29 For example, balance sheets and income statements offer little 
insight into the risks associated with the returns from particular corporate 
projects, even though (as options theory demonstrates) risk is critical to 
measuring economic value. Similarly, contemporary accounting conventions 
fail to measure many of the firm’s important intangible assets and liabilities, 
such as the value of employees’ firm specific human capital,30 or the implicit 
obligations associated with many employees’ expectations (expectations 
often encouraged by managers) that if the firm does well, capable employees 
 
 
 28. The mediating hierarch model we discuss here is contractarian in spirit, but it specifically 
rejects principal-agent analysis as the best way of modeling the core problem addressed by corporate 
law. The model argues instead that the central contracting problem in many business enterprises is the 
team production problem. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40. 
 29. A third factor that may have contributed to the notion that shareholders are the only residual 
claimants of firms is the bankruptcy principle of absolute priority. This principle is supposed to ensure 
that, in the event of a liquidation of corporate assets through the bankruptcy process, shareholders only 
get paid something if there are assets left over after all contractual claimants are paid.  This principle 
may be honored more in the breach than in practice, especially after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1994). Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor 
corporation may file for protection from creditors while it works out its problems, 11 U.S.C. § 1121 
(1994), and the Code also permits a restructuring plan to be accepted by the bankruptcy court even if it 
does not follow absolute priority, if the plan is approved by a vote of the majority (representing two-
thirds of the value of claims) of each class of claimants, 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994). Although 
bankruptcy law implicitly recognizes the importance of going concern value—this is the problem 
Chapter 11 was designed to address—any theory of the firm based on the assumed distribution of 
assets in liquidation obviously fails to include going concern value. When one considers the additional 
assets and liabilities associated with a going concern, it becomes clear that the only cases in which 
shareholders can properly be assumed to be the sole residual claimants in corporations are static, end-
game scenarios, such as liquidation, and even then only if absolute priority is enforced. 
 30. See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF 
THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES (2001) (discussing implications for public policy of 
the growing importance of intangible assets in the U.S. economy); BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: 
MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING (2001) (quantifying the role played by intangible 
assets in value creation in corporations). 
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will be rewarded with raises, promotions, and job security.31 As a result, so 
long as the firm remains a going concern, the present value of the wealth it 
creates, destroys, or redistributes to various corporate participants may be far 
greater, or far less, than the income statements and balance sheets show. 
Moreover, nonshareholder interests are likely capturing a substantial portion 
of this unseen and unreported wealth.32 
IV. TEAM PRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND DIRECTORS’ ROLES AS 
MEDIATING HIERARCHS 
As the discussion above suggests, a careful inspection of the economic 
realities of corporations reveals that, as an empirical matter, shareholders will 
almost never be the sole residual claimants or sole residual risk bearers in a 
public firm. Creditors, managers, employees—even suppliers, customers, and 
communities—also make firm-specific investments that tie their economic 
fortunes to the firm’s fate. Moreover, because shareholders enjoy limited 
liability, their interest in the firm has option-like characteristics, and they can 
benefit from strategies that increase risk (much of the cost of which is borne 
by other claimants). Accordingly, there is good reason in economic theory to 
question whether a shareholder primacy rule would be economically 
efficient. 
But the observation that nonshareholder groups also bear residual risk and 
hold residual claims in public firms has a second important implication: 
principal-agent analysis may be insufficient for analyzing the central 
problems of corporate law. Put differently, the typical public corporation 
involves several groups with potentially conflicting interests, each of which 
might legitimately claim to be a corporate “principal”.33 Corporate 
 
 
 31. Although such factors have always been important in measuring long-term value, there is 
reason to believe that in recent years intangibles have outstripped physical assets in terms of their 
importance to corporate wealth creation. The market capitalization of publicly traded corporations in 
the United States is now several times larger than the value of the assets recorded on balance sheets. 
See LEV, supra note 30, at 9 fig. 1-19 (showing the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity of Standard & Poors 500 firms was more than six to one as of year 2000); Robert E. Hall, The 
Stock Market and Capital Accumulation 4 (1999) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, working paper no. 
7180) (concluding that the discrepancy between the market value of corporate securities and the 
replacement cost of physical assets was so large at the end of 1998 (more than two to one) that it could 
only be explained by assuming that corporations had large amounts of intangible assets not being 
measured in the national accounts). There is no way to estimate what portion of the total value of 
intangibles captured in corporate security prices is attributable to firm-specific human capital. 
 32. Asset specificity is different conceptually from intangibility, but many specific investments 
made by nonshareholders (such as investments in relationship building and specialized knowledge) are 
intangible and do not show up on the books as corporate assets. 
 33. Principal-agent analysis, at least as it is usually employed in the corporate literature, tends to 
be asymmetric—it focuses only on the possibility that the agent might opportunistically exploit the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/1
p403 Stout Blair.doc  12/20/2001   9:03 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY 419 
 
 
 
 
production thus involves not only an agency contracting problem, but also a 
second type of economic contracting problem called the "team production" 
problem. 
We use the phrase “team production” to refer to complex productive 
activity that requires multiple parties to make contributions that are to some 
extent both team specific34 and unverifiable35 to an outside party, such as a 
court. A third key attribute of team production is that the resulting output is 
nonseparable, meaning that it is impossible to attribute any particular portion 
of the result to any particular member’s contribution. A team’s output may be 
nonseparable because each member’s contribution is necessary to the 
outcome,36 or because each member’s contribution is unobservable or so 
complex that it is impossible to estimate what the team’s output would be 
without that contribution. 
These characteristics of team production make it extremely difficult for 
team members to design compensation contracts that provide adequate 
incentives for each team member to make optimal contributions to the team, 
whether those contributions take the form of dollars, ideas, or hard work.37 
For example, suppose the team members agree to divide up any surplus 
created by team production according to some prearranged formula, like 
“everyone gets an equal share of profits.” Under such a rule, team members 
would be tempted to shirk on making any contribution that could not easily 
be verified, because they would bear all the cost of the contribution but get 
 
 
principal, rather than on opportunism running in the other direction. The observation that corporations 
may require many different groups to make specific investments that leave them vulnerable to each 
other raises the alternative possibility of mutual opportunism. 
 34. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz may have been the first economists to use the 
expression “team production” to describe production requiring multiple inputs and producing a 
nonseparable output. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). See also Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in 
Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982). Alchian and Demsetz did not, however, address the additional 
contracting problems created when team production requires team-specific investment. Recently, 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales addressed this additional problem, although they do not employ 
the rubric of “team production.” See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the 
Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998) (discussing contracting solutions in team-like situations in which 
participants must make investments that are specific to the enterprise). 
 35. Actions by various participants in a corporate enterprise may be “observable” by other 
participants, but not subject to verification by a third party. Many “intangible” investments, for 
example, cannot be measured in ways that are subject to audit. Agreements to make such investments 
consequently cannot be regulated by contract because they are not enforceable by a court of law. 
 36. Economists normally assume that workers are paid according to their marginal contribution 
to production. But suppose it takes two people working together to move a piano up a flight of stairs. If 
either person quits, the other cannot do it by himself. It is meaningless in such a situation to speak of 
the “marginal contribution” of either worker. Both are necessary to do the job. 
 37. For a discussion of various proposed contracting solutions and their real-world analogies and 
problems, see Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 265-69. 
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back only a portion of the resulting increase in surplus. 
Yet if the team members do not decide in advance who is to get what, and 
the team is successful, they run into a second problem. Because the resources 
they invested often cannot be recouped once team production has begun 
(e.g., time, energy, ideas, or financial capital spent on wages or specialized 
equipment), team members cannot protect their interests by threatening to 
withdraw these resources and sell them to some third party in the 
marketplace. Team members can instead only get a return on their 
investment if they get a share of the team’s output. Without an ex ante 
agreement about how to divide that output, each team member has an 
incentive to try to claim the largest share possible. Thus any surplus created 
by team production may be dissipated quickly through the squabbling and 
“rent-seeking” that results. 
Corporations provide a classic example of team production. In order to 
earn profits from producing and selling goods and services, corporations 
need investors and lenders to provide financial capital, as well as 
entrepreneurs, managers, and employees to provide ideas, expertise, and 
labor. Once such resources are invested in the firm, they often become, at 
least in part, specific to the firm, in the sense that they do not have much if 
any value in the external market. The resources’ value therefore depends on 
whether or not the project is successful. Moreover, while some portion of 
these contributions can be quantified (like the dollars lenders invest and the 
hours managers put in) other components (such as the risk lenders bear and 
the quality of managers’ efforts) are far more difficult for an outside party, 
such as a court, to measure. 
Consider the simple example of an entrepreneur who has an idea for a 
potentially valuable type of software. Since the entrepreneur needs money to 
develop her idea, she teams up with a financier. Both parties are aware that 
the joint venture may produce great profit, but both also recognize that any 
investment they make will swiftly become, in part, team specific. The 
financier cannot easily recover the full value of her investment once it has 
been spent on salaries and specialized equipment, just as the entrepreneur 
cannot recover her time and effort. Both must wait and hope that the project 
succeeds in order to receive a return. In the meantime, the reality of a 
complex and uncertain business environment makes it difficult for them to 
draft enforceable contracts that detail their contributions. How can they 
determine in advance when the financier should be required to invest more 
capital, and when he will be justified in pulling the plug? How can they 
specify when the entrepreneur’s efforts qualify for her to receive a bonus, 
and when she should be fired? Of course, the parties could wait to see how 
the venture turns out before deciding who gets what share of the profit or 
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loss. If they wait, however, they are likely to lose valuable time and resources 
squabbling with each other, with no obvious solution. 
Such contracting problems, if left unsolved, can discourage potentially 
profitable team production from taking place. A new solution to the team 
production contracting problem has emerged in economic theory in recent 
years, however.38 In brief, this solution requires the team members to jointly 
agree to give up control over their team specific inputs and over any surplus 
that results from team production, and to cede this control to a neutral third 
party. This third party, whom we refer to as a mediating hierarch, decides 
who receives what share of the surplus.39 Ideally, the hierarch does this with 
an eye toward maximizing the total surplus, while ensuring that each team 
member receives a large enough share to induce her to invest optimally in 
team production in the first place. Of course, for this solution to work, it is 
essential that the hierarch remain free from the command and control of any 
of the team members.40 
In a recent article, we proposed that the idea of a mediating hierarch may 
be essential to understanding the economic and legal functions of the 
corporate board of directors.41 Let us return to the example of the 
entrepreneur and the financier. This time, let us also bring into the equation a 
neutral outsider whom both sides trust to make judgments about each side’s 
efforts and to allocate the resulting rewards. If they can find such a third 
party, the entrepreneur and the financier might be willing to pursue their 
project—provided that the third party is given the ultimate right to decide any 
conflict over the division of the surplus. In this fashion, the team members 
solve the team production contracting problem and discourage mutual rent-
seeking by agreeing to subject themselves to a mediating hierarch who will 
monitor their efforts and decide how to divide the spoils. 
 
 
 38. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 34. 
 39. This solution implicitly assumes that team production inputs need not be verifiable by a 
court, see supra text and note 35 (discussing verifiability), in order to be monitored and rewarded by 
the hierarch. In the corporate context, it seems quite plausible that a board of directors would have a 
far more accurate understanding than a court would of the relative contributions made and rewards due 
to various corporate participants. See Linda Keslar, The Architecht, Feb. 13, 2001, at 
http:www.law.com (quoting former Delaware Chancellor William Allen that “the board has all the 
information and the courts don’t”). 
 40. It is also important that each team member believes the hierarch will provide enough of a 
share of the surplus that the member will get a greater return on investing in team production than in 
competing projects. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 279.  
 41. Id. The idea of resolving problems of mutual opportunism by ceding control to a third-party 
hierarch is actually something of a standard move in legal theory. In a sense, this is what litigants ask 
judges to do, and there is a long tradition in political theory dating back at least to Hobbes that 
suggests such a role for a coercive state. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 168-69 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1651).  
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In a public corporation where no single shareholder or group of 
shareholders owns a controlling block of shares, the role of the mediating 
heirarch can be played by the board of directors. In fact, recent empirical 
evidence suggests that this mediating role is exactly what many corporate 
promoters seek from the board when they cause the corporation to “go 
public.” Academic studies of firms planning an initial public offering show 
that even though outside investors (e.g., venture capital firms) may often hold 
majority blocks of stock, at the time the firm goes public the board is 
structured so that neither the block investors nor the firm’s founders make up 
a majority of the seats on the board.42 “Independent” directors who are 
neither part of management, nor representatives of the venture capitalists, 
typically hold enough votes to determine the outcome in any dispute between 
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. In a recent working paper, 
Stephen Choi argues that this structure is designed to reassure the firm’s 
entrepreneurs and employees on the one hand, and its contributors of 
financial capital on the other, that neither side can readily manage the firm in 
a fashion detrimental to the other.43 Choi further concludes that the likelihood 
that a firm going public would adopt this “contestable” board structure 
correlates with several proxies for managers’ firm-specific investment.44 
The mediating hierarchy model is similarly supported by empirical 
studies finding that approximately two-thirds of firms adopt some sort of 
antitakeover provisions before they go public.45 If antitakeover provisions 
simply give directors leeway to allow managers to impose agency costs 
inefficiently on shareholders, this strategy makes little sense because it 
reduces the economic value of the firm as measured by the investing public’s 
willingness to pay for its equity shares.46 The adoption of antitakeover 
provisions at the initial public offering stage makes sense, however, as a 
means of encouraging team production by reassuring the firm’s managers 
and employees that their futures rest in the hands of the board of directors, 
rather than with shareholders who might be tempted to sell them out in the 
“market for corporate control.”47 
 
 
 42. See Julia Porter Liebeskind, Ownership, Incentives, and Control in New Biotechnology 
Firms, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP, supra note 22, at 299; Stephen Choi, What Determines Board 
Composition? CEOs and Firm-Specific Investments in Human Capital (2000) (working paper, on file 
with author). 
 43. Choi, supra note 42, at 2-3. 
 44. Id. at 2. 
 45. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover 
Protection in IPOs 3-4 (2000) (working paper, on file with authors). 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. See infra text accompanying note 91 (discussing market for corporate control). 
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V. CORPORATE LAW SUPPORTS THE BOARD’S MEDIATING ROLE 
Once we recognize that boards of directors can play a valuable mediating 
role among the several groups that may comprise residual claimants in a 
corporation, a variety of important aspects of corporate law that have proven 
difficult to explain under the principal-agent model of the firm begin to make 
sense. Although we have explored this idea in greater detail in our prior 
work,48 below we briefly discuss some of the more central elements of U.S. 
corporate law that support the board’s ability to serve as a mediating 
hierarch, at least in publicly held firms. As will be seen, U.S. law grants 
directors tremendous discretion to adopt corporate strategies that enhance the 
value of nonshareholders’ residual claims within the firm, even if these 
strategies decrease the value of shareholders’ claims. For reasons we explore, 
this may well serve the interests of shareholders as a class over the long run. 
But it clearly does not serve the interests of every shareholder or shareholder 
group, at every firm, at all times. Thus corporate law in the United States 
(while perhaps more shareholder-oriented than corporate law in many other 
developed countries) comes closer to reflecting and supporting the mediating 
hierarch view of the board’s role, than it does a view of directors as 
shareholders’ agents. 
A. Directors are Autonomous Fiduciaries, Not “Agents” 
Let us begin with the fundamental idea of the corporation as a legal entity. 
When a corporation is formed, a new legal being is born. As a matter of law, 
this entity, and not any of its participants, owns the assets used in corporate 
production, as well as any surplus produced by the enterprise. And as a 
matter of law, this entity (along with its assets and surpluses) is controlled not 
by any individual or group with a direct stake in its future, but by a board of 
directors made up of individuals who may have no economic interest in the 
firm at all.49 
These directors are not, in any legal sense, anyone’s “agents.”50 Most 
 
 
 48. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 276-87. 
 49. See supra note 1. Directors may also be shareholders or managers, in which case they may 
have a substantial economic stake in the firm in those capacities. See infra text accompanying notes 
121-22 (discussing directors as shareholders) and n.87 (directors as managers). But as a matter of law, 
this is not required. Control over corporate assets can, accordingly, lie in the hands of individuals who 
have no direct economic stake in how those assets are used.  
 50. The point is perhaps most neatly summarized by Dean Robert Clark, who notes that under 
U.S. law: 
(1) corporate officers like the president and treasurer are agents of the corporation itself; (2) the 
board of directors is the ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and in a sense is the 
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obviously, directors do not owe any duty of obedience to shareholders or to 
anyone else, as an agent would in a standard principal-agent relationship.51 
While the directors enjoy ultimate control over the corporation’s assets, 
including control over how those assets are used and how any surplus will be 
distributed, they are not subject to the direct control of any outside party. For 
example, suppose the shareholders want the board to fire the chief executive 
officer (CEO) or to declare a substantial dividend. Although they can present 
a proposal requesting such action, the board is free to ignore it.52 Corporate 
law does not permit shareholders to command the board to action even by a 
unanimous vote. This pattern makes little sense under a contractarian model 
of the corporation that treats directors as shareholders’ agents.53  
The fact that the directors are not subject to any corporate participant’s 
direct control does not mean, however, that directors are free to use this 
autonomy to promote their own interests. Rather than being agents, directors 
play a role that more closely resembles that of an autonomous trustee or 
fiduciary who is charged with serving another’s interests. Thus numerous 
judicial opinions describe the director’s role in fiduciary terms. Moreover, 
many of these cases explicitly observe that, as fiduciaries, directors owe their 
duties to the firm itself.54 
 
 
group most appropriately identified with “the corporation”); (3) directors are not agents of the 
corporation but are sui generis; (4) neither officers nor directors are agents of the stockholders; but 
(5) both officers and directors are “fiduciaries” with respect to the corporation and its 
stockholders. 
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).  
 51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958) (describing the agent’s duty of 
obedience). 
 52. See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that directors have no 
obligation to respond to shareholder resolution demanding reinstatement of dismissed officer). This 
pattern is so well-established in corporate law that the federal rules regulating shareholder proposals 
allow directors to refuse to include in their proxy materials any proposal demanding that the directors 
take action as “not a proper subject for action by shareholders.” Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2000). To prevent exclusion, the proposal must be recast as a recommendation 
rather than a demand. See generally SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 8, at 601 (describing federal 
shareholder proposal rules and requirement that proposal be precatory rather than mandatory). 
 53. One could, perhaps, defend insulating directors from the dictates of a majority of the 
shareholders under a rule of shareholder primacy on the grounds that this helps to protect minority 
shareholders. In effect, this approach suggests that directors are mediating heirarchs—that they only 
mediate disputes among shareholders. This argument cannot, however, explain why directors are free 
to ignore a unanimous shareholder request. 
 54. See, e.g., United Teachers Associated Ins. Co. v. MacKeen & Bailey, Inc., 99 F.3d 645, 650-
51 (5th Cir. 1996) (director owes fiduciary duty “to the corporation”). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (1956) (stating that directors owe duties to “the corporation itself 
rather than to the shareholders individually or collectively”). Other cases describe directors’ duties as 
running to the “firm and its shareholders,” a phrase implying the two terms are not synonymous. See, 
e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (“[T]he board of 
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This pattern makes sense under a model of corporate law that views the 
board as a mediating hierarch overseeing team production. Using team 
analysis, the “firm” can be understood as a nexus of firm-specific assets that 
have been invested by a variety of groups, including most obviously 
shareholders, bondholders, managers, and employees. The board of directors 
acts as a fiduciary for the firm, meaning that it seeks to maximize the total 
value of these combined economic interests.55 In order to do this, it is 
essential that the board remain free from any single group’s control. 
Of course, in saying that the board “controls” the firm, we do not intend 
to suggest that the individual members of the board actually run the business 
on a day-to-day basis. Although they have the collective power to do so, in 
most large firms the directors delegate this task to executive officers and 
employees, who are true agents of the firm in a legal sense. Moreover, 
having taken the trouble to appoint professional managers, it is logical that 
most boards will then tend to defer to their agents’ expertise, sometimes to 
the extent of appearing to simply “rubber stamp” the CEO’s decisions. But 
this pattern should not obscure an important corporate reality—legally, it is 
the board that hires the CEO, not the other way around.56 Increasingly, it is 
also the board that fires the CEO—a practice so common that the cover of 
Business Week recently trumpeted that CEOs are “dropping like flies.”57 
In other words, it is the board, and not the professional managers, that 
retains the power to control major decisions in most large firms, including 
decisions about when shareholders are paid dividends and what the 
managers’ compensation should be (two issues of special importance in 
determining the allocation of team surpluses). The corporate buck stops not 
 
 
directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”); Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Inc., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act 
derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes 
stockholders, from harm.”). See also Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 293-94 & nn.105-06 (discussing 
the question). 
 55. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 288. See also Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities 
to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 319-22 
(1998) (noting that while the law and economics literature tends to focus on share value as the standard 
of success in corporations, the notion of “optimality” of corporate contracts has at least two possible 
meanings: one is that shareholder value is maximized; the other is that the joint wealth of shareholders 
and other participants is maximized). 
 56. This is especially clear in the case of firms where a majority of the board is made up of 
outside directors who are not employees of the company, a category that includes seventy percent of 
the largest 1,000 or so U.S. corporations. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of the 
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 844-45 
(1999). See infra notes 75-76, 86-80 (discussing boundaries of mediating model). 
 57. Anthony Bianco & Louis Lavelle, The CEO Trap, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 11, 2000 (on the cover 
page). See also id. at 86 (noting that two-thirds of all major companies replaced their CEO at least 
once in the past six years).  
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in the corner office but in the boardroom. This is likely to be true, moreover, 
even when the board appears to play a relatively passive role. After all, once 
a trusted heirarch is in place, team members will often be able to reach 
agreement among themselves about who contributes what and who gets 
what, because they know that excessive shirking or rent-seeking is likely to 
get “kicked upstairs” for board review. Directors do not need to take an 
active role in firm decisionmaking to discourage opportunistic behavior 
among corporate team members, any more than police officers need to 
operate all the vehicles on the highway to discourage speeding. 
What clearly is required for the board to perform a mediating role, 
however, is a significant degree of freedom from the control of the members 
of the corporate “team”—including the shareholders. Thus, we briefly 
address below two aspects of corporate law that, on first inspection, appear to 
give shareholders significant control over the board: derivative suits and 
shareholder voting. 
B. The Role of Derivative Actions  
If a director violates the fiduciary duties she owes the firm, other 
members of the board have both the authority and the responsibility to take 
legal action against her on the corporation’s behalf. Situations arise, however, 
in which the directors as a group are subject to potential liability, or are 
reluctant to initiate a lawsuit against a fellow board member. Recognizing 
this reality, corporate law generally permits shareholders to “step into the 
shoes” of the corporation in such circumstances by bringing a derivative suit 
on behalf of the corporation.58 
Corporate law normally grants standing to bring a derivative suit only to 
shareholders and not to other corporate participants.59 This right should not, 
however, be interpreted to mean that directors owe fiduciary duties only to 
 
 
 58. See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-64 (1986) (describing 
derivative suits). 
 59. Corporate law allows bondholders and other creditors to bring claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty against the board if the corporation is at or near insolvency. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (discussing 
doctrine and approving action of board that protected creditor over protest of a 98.5 percent 
shareholder, and noting that, at least when the corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, 
the board is not merely the agent of the shareholders as residual risk bearers but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise as a whole). This suggests that shareholders are normally permitted to bring such 
suits primarily because shareholders’ interests are usually a reasonable proxy for the interests of the 
corporation as a whole. If a company is, however, at or near insolvency, shareholders’ preference for 
risky strategies may make them poor representatives for other participants in the firm. See also supra 
text accompanying notes 17-20 (discussing options theory and firm risk). At this point the law grants 
standing to other constituencies, notably creditors.  
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shareholders. Any judgment won in a derivative suit must be paid to the 
corporation and not the shareholders.60 More important, careful inspection of 
the substantive nature of directors’ fiduciary duties reveals that shareholders 
can only bring a successful derivative suit in circumstances where directors 
act in a fashion that hurts not just shareholders, but other residual claimants 
as well. 61 
This point is perhaps best illustrated in the case of a suit alleging breach 
of a director’s duty of loyalty to the firm. The duty of loyalty prohibits 
directors from various forms of self-dealing, including prohibiting them from 
taking a business opportunity or other property that belongs to the 
corporation.62 As a practical matter, courts tend to hold directors liable only 
in egregious situations involving a significant pecuniary benefit to the 
director or loss to the firm, and in which the offending director or directors 
failed to subject the self-dealing transaction to an informed vote by the 
disinterested directors or the shareholders.63 As this description makes clear, 
the duty of loyalty works primarily to prevent directors from indulging in 
more blatant forms of theft. Because such theft reduces the economic value 
of the firm as a whole, it harms not only shareholders, but also bondholders, 
employees, and other residual claimants in the firm. 
It is important to note, however, that directors will not be deemed to 
violate the duty of loyalty in transactions that simply transfer corporate 
wealth from one residual claimant to another, even when this benefits other 
corporate constituencies at the shareholders’ expense. For example, directors 
do not violate their duty of loyalty when they protect creditors by avoiding 
risky strategies that would benefit the shareholders,64 or when they contribute 
corporate funds to charitable organizations.65 This is true even though 
transactions that benefit other corporate constituencies may also provide 
nonpecuniary benefits to the directors themselves. For example, directors 
may cause the corporation to make donations to charities they favor 
personally. Similarly, directors can reject risky but potentially profitable 
 
 
 60. The cash will only end up in the shareholders’ hands if a dividend is subsequently paid, and, 
of course, directors control the decision to pay dividends. See CLARK, supra note 58, at 594 (noting 
that decision to pay dividends is a matter for the directors’ business judgment). Procedural rules, 
moreover, make it difficult for shareholders to file derivative actions and so tend to insulate directors 
even from this form of shareholder challenge and control. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 294 
n.107 and surrounding text for more detail on these procedural rules. 
 61. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 298. 
 62. See generally CLARK, supra note 58, at 141-57 (describing the duty of loyalty). 
 63. Id. at 141, 167.  
 64. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 
277613, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 65. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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business strategies, an approach that benefits the firm’s creditors but also 
increases the likelihood that the corporation will stay in business and the 
directors will keep their positions.66  
A similar analysis can be applied to cases alleging breach of the duty of 
care. In theory, the duty of care requires directors to manage the firm with the 
care of a reasonably prudent person. In practice, this standard is modified by 
the “business judgment rule,” which protects directors from liability provided 
they are free of personal conflicts of interest and make the effort to act in an 
“informed” fashion.67 This focus on procedure ensures that duty of care cases 
can only be brought in circumstances where the interests of all the 
corporation’s residual claimants are served. After all, bondholders, managers, 
and employees share the stockholders’ interest in ensuring that the board 
does not take hasty, uninformed action. 
If the board follows proper procedures, however, it remains free to take 
actions that protect other corporate constituencies while reducing the value of 
the shareholders’ economic interest in the firm. For example, directors can 
unilaterally raise retirees’ pension benefits,68 refuse to adopt a corporate 
strategy that would increase profits but harm the local community,69 and fend 
off a hostile takeover bid at a premium price in order to protect the interests 
of the firm’s employees, the local community, or the firm’s “culture”.70 
Critics of the team production approach point out that, in upholding such 
director action, courts sometimes rationalize that the board serves the 
shareholders’ interests “in the long run.”71 As we discuss below, because the 
 
 
 66. Clark has called such action[s] “corporate action[s] with mixed motives.” See CLARK, supra 
note 58, at 142. See generally Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 
28 STETSON L. REV. 27 (1998) (using team production analysis to defend directors’ legal discretion to 
use corporate funds for charitable purposes). 
 67. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984)). See generally CLARK, supra note 58, at 123-40 (discussing the duty of care and 
the business judgment rule). 
 68. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz & Matt Murray, Amid Protests, GE Will Boost Pension Checks, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2000, at A3 (reporting that following demonstrations by retired employees, 
General Electric announced a pension increase of fifteen to thirty-five percent for employees who 
retired before 1986). 
 69. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 70. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that in 
deciding whether a takeover posed a threat to “the corporate enterprise,” directors could take account 
of the impact on nonshareholders, including “creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally”); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (describing how the directors of 
the Holland Furnace Company fended off a hostile acquirer, in part, to protect employees); Paramount 
Communications v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,514 (Del. Ch. 
July 14, 1989) (describing and upholding decision of directors of Time to reject Paramount’s premium 
offer in order to pursue a merger that would preserve “Time[’s] culture” of journalistic integrity). The 
obvious exception to this last rule is the Revlon case. See infra text accompanying note 75. 
 71. A recent essay by David Millon and a working paper by Alan Meese critique the mediating 
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institution of a board of directors insulates other corporate residual claimants 
from shareholder opportunism to some degree, it can encourage profitable 
team production that otherwise would not take place. Thus granting directors 
broad autonomy may indeed serve the interests of shareholders, both as a 
class and in the long run. But it also clearly disserves the interests of some 
firms’ shareholders, at some times. 
For a striking example of this, one need look no further than the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s notorious decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time.72 In that case, the court upheld a decision by the board of Time, Inc. to 
reject a $200 cash per share takeover bid by Paramount, in favor of pursuing 
a merger with Warner Communications in which the Time shareholders 
would receive securities trading at a market price of $125 per share. In other 
words, the court found that a decision reducing the immediate market value 
of the Time shareholders’ interests by thirty-five percent did not violate the 
directors’ duties of loyalty or care.73 The court defended this holding on the 
grounds that it is the job of the directors, and not of the shareholders, to 
decide what course best served the interests of the firm and its shareholders 
in the “long term.”74  
As the Time decision illustrates, by mouthing the rhetoric of the long run, 
courts can freely approve director actions that reduce the value of the 
shareholders’ interests today. Director decisions to reallocate resources from 
shareholders to other corporate constituencies thus are largely insulated from 
shareholder challenge—at least as long as the public corporation remains in 
existence, so that there is a “long run” to appeal to. 
This observation helps explain the only situation where Delaware courts 
require directors to maximize the value of a firm’s shares: when a firm is 
 
 
hierarch model on the basis of this rhetoric. See David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? 
A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000); Alan J. 
Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment (2001) (working 
paper, on file with author).  
 72. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 73. The only way such a decision could be consistent with shareholder primacy and market 
efficiency is if the court believed that Time’s directors had access to private information indicating that 
the Warner merger would soon produce tremendous benefits that eventually would be incorporated 
into the market price and raise it above the Paramount offer. See supra note 6 (discussing market 
efficiency). See generally Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the 
Shareholder Role: Sacred Space and Corporate Takeovers, 80 U. TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) 
(implicitly adopting this argument while noting that director discretion can also be used to protect 
other constituencies). But if this possibility is what the court intended to suggest, subsequent events 
did not support such a prediction. More important, by allowing the directors to argue that a strategy of 
reducing shareholder value today would actually enhance shareholder wealth tomorrow, the court 
implicitly granted the board discretion to favor nonshareholder interests. 
 74. Time Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1150. 
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about to be sold to a controlling shareholder or group of shareholders, and so 
about to cease being a “public” firm at all. Under the doctrine espoused in 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,75 when a public firm is 
about to “go private,” the board must do its best to maximize the price the 
shareholders receive for their shares. This is an end-game scenario, however, 
in which the public shareholders are about to be squeezed out of the 
corporate “team”. Hence it makes sense for the court to grant the 
shareholders special protections.76  
In contrast, so long as the directors intend to maintain the public 
corporation as a going concern, team production is better protected by 
ensuring that no single corporate constituency can use the threat of a 
derivative suit to force the board to favor their particular interests over other 
team members’ interests. In accord with this, corporate law provides that 
neither the duty of loyalty nor the duty of care precludes directors from 
aiding other corporate constituencies at the shareholders’ expense. This result 
seems peculiar indeed under a principal-agent model of the firm that views 
directors’ fiduciary duties as running to shareholders alone. It is consistent, 
however, with the mediating hierarchy model and the idea that the directors’ 
role is to prevent or discourage corporate participants from attempting to 
exploit each others’ firm-specific investments, by taking control of those 
investments and the resulting surplus out of the participants’ hands and 
placing it in the hands of a board of directors.77 
C. The Role of Shareholder Voting and the Public/Private Firm 
Distinction 
The discussion above suggests that while derivative suits on first 
inspection appear to give shareholders a power over directors that other 
corporate constituents lack, in practice, shareholders may only bring 
 
 
 75. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (holding that Revlon applies when a firm is to be sold to a controlling 
shareholder); Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1998) 
(holding that Revlon applies to a recapitalization in which management’s share ownership would 
increase from five to fifty-five percent); compare Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (holding that Revlon does not apply to a merger between two publicly held 
entities where the surviving entity also would be publicly held). 
 76. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 308-09 (discussing Revlon as an end-game scenario). 
 77. If shareholders or other corporate constituents could easily bring lawsuits against directors 
for breach of fiduciary duty, they might be tempted to use the threat of such lawsuits to persuade the 
directors to favor their interests over other groups’, and so seek rents from other participants in the 
corporate enterprise. This would undermine the ability of all team members to make credible ex ante 
commitments to discourage rent–seeking by ceding control over the joint enterprise to a mediating 
hierarch. Without such a credible commitment, investment in team production might not take place.  
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successful claims in circumstances where doing so is likely to serve other 
residual claimants’ interests as well. In other words, shareholders cannot use 
derivative suits as vehicles for “rent-seeking” against other corporate team 
members. This argument does not apply, however, to a second unique right 
shareholders enjoy—the right to vote to elect and sometimes to remove 
directors, and to veto certain “fundamental” corporate changes such as 
mergers. Why does the law give shareholders voting rights when it does not 
usually grant other corporate participants this privilege?78 
In our prior work on team production theory, we suggested two possible 
answers.79 The first is that shareholder voting is merely instrumental. 
Shareholders get to vote for directors for same reason that shareholders get to 
sue derivatively–someone has to choose the directors. As a group, moreover, 
shareholders in a public corporation may have more homogeneous interests 
(and so be less susceptible to coalitions, logrolling, and other voting 
pathologies) than other sorts of residual claimants, such as managers or 
creditors, whose interests are more diverse.80 Finally, while shareholders’ 
interest in maximizing the value of their shares may often conflict with the 
interests of other residual claimants, this is not always true. Many strategies 
that increase share value serve other groups as well. Thus, at least when its 
role is confined to selecting directors who will then be largely free from any 
single residual claimant’s direct control, shareholder voting may be an 
acceptable, if imperfect, proxy for the preferences of the corporate team as a 
whole.81  
A second possible explanation is that shareholders enjoy unique voting 
rights as a form of compensation for the unique vulnerabilities they suffer 
compared to other residual claimants.82 Especially in publicly held firms with 
widely dispersed share ownership, shareholders have almost no ability to 
enter explicit contracts with the firm and relatively little opportunity to 
interact directly with the board of directors, especially when compared with 
debtholders, employees, and managers. They have, as a result, few salient 
 
 
 78. See CLARK, supra note 58, at 94-95 (discussing shareholder voting rights). Nothing in 
corporate law prevents firms from adopting charters that provide for voting by other participants. For 
example, at UAL Corp. (the parent company of United Airlines), three employee groups (the pilots 
union, the mechanics union, and the nonunion employees) each control one seat on the board of 
directors. See Terry Savage, United Airlines Anything But United: Some Wonder If Employee 
Ownership Has Become an ESOP Fable, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at 56. Voting by 
nonshareholder constituencies, however, is relatively rare in the United States. 
 79. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 309-15 (discussing the implications of the mediating 
hierarchy model for understanding shareholder voting rights).  
 80. Id. & 313 n.175. 
 81. Id. & nn.176-78. 
 82. Id. at 314. 
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opportunities to express their views—except at election time.83 Giving 
shareholders unique but limited voting rights may be justified as a means of 
“leveling the playing field” so that shareholders can compete with other 
residual claimants in terms of their ability to capture the board’s ear.84  
Perhaps most important in explaining why shareholder voting does not 
destroy the board’s ability to act as a mediating hierarch, however, may be 
the tremendous difference between the role shareholder voting plays in 
public corporations, and the role it plays in privately held firms. In a privately 
held or “close” corporation, a single shareholder or group of shareholders 
holds a majority interest in the firm’s shares. Absent cumulative voting or 
some similar device, these controlling shareholders have the practical ability 
to select who will serve as directors and to remove directors who refuse to do 
their bidding.85 This element of enhanced control suggests that directors’ 
ability to act as neutral mediators between shareholders and other groups (for 
example, employees and managers) in private firms may be limited. In other 
words, as suggested in our earlier discussion of Revlon, the mediating 
hierarchy model may not apply to the board of a closely held firm.86  
 
 
 83. Indeed, the recent trend toward the adoption of equity-based compensation systems probably 
influences directors’ choices a great deal more than shareholders voting rights do. See infra text 
accompanying notes 120-22 (discussing equity-based director compensation). 
 The observation that shareholders have a difficult time contracting might support a reasoned 
argument for shareholder primacy if shareholders’ contracting problems are severe and other groups’ 
relatively insignificant. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, 
and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 188-92. At this 
point, however, the wisdom of shareholder primacy becomes an empirical question. If, as much 
evidence suggests, the contracting problems of nonshareholder groups remain substantial enough to 
discourage team production, see supra text accompanying notes 21-26, 34-38 (discussing employees’ 
residual interests), a mediating hierarch might be a better, albeit second best, solution. We suspect that 
the answer varies from time to time and from firm to firm. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88 
(discussing public versus private firm distinction). We do not, however, object to shareholder primacy 
in any particular firm, but only a strict and unthinking rule that shareholder primacy is best in all firms.  
 84. This also may explain why shareholders enjoy the right to veto certain “fundamental 
corporate changes” such as mergers or dissolutions. Such changes present end-game problems similar 
to those involved in Revlon. See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing Revlon). 
 85. Even for controlling shareholders, there are significant procedural hurdles involved in 
changing the board of directors. See generally CLARK, supra note 58, at 105 (discussing voting 
requirements of notice, a quorum, cause for removal, and so forth).  
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. This likely explains why shareholders in privately 
held firms in many states may choose to manage their firms directly rather than through an elected 
board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350-51 (2000) (describing special rules permitting 
shareholders in closely held firms to dispense with a board of directors). 
 An interesting question is what role directors play in firms in which a single shareholder or group 
of shareholders owns a large block of stock that falls short of a majority interest, thus falling 
somewhere between these two categories. For an excellent discussion of this question, see Coates, 
supra note 56. Coates questions the significance of the mediating hierarchy model given that many 
nominally “public” firms have shareholders who effectively control the firm through ownership of a 
large block of shares.  
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We do not mean to imply that team production does not pose contracting 
problems in private firms; it does.87 Private firms, however, may rely 
primarily on mechanisms other than a neutral board to discourage shirking 
and rent–seeking among corporate participants. For example, controlling 
shareholders’ tendency to also hold management positions in private firms 
does much to bring these two groups’ interests into alignment. Similarly, 
privately held firms are usually much smaller than public corporations, and 
as a result, their employees may be more willing to rely on interpersonal trust 
as protection against shareholder and manager opportunism.88 
Shareholder voting plays a much different role in a public corporation 
with hundreds or thousands of stockholders. As noted earlier, shareholders in 
such firms can vote only to elect or remove directors, or to veto a limited 
class of fundamental corporate changes that the directors must first 
propose.89 And, as a practical matter, shareholders are precluded from 
effectively exercising even these limited formal rights. Because informed 
shareholder voting is a public good, shareholders (like other voters) are prone 
to “rational apathy.” The problem is worsened by the fact that 
communicating with one’s fellow shareholders through the proxy process is 
notoriously difficult and expensive. In contrast, if an activist shareholder 
attempts to challenge the board through the proxy process, the directors enjoy 
access to the corporation’s treasury in defending themselves in the ensuing 
 
 
 Coates concedes, however, that even under this very strict test, most large companies in the 
United States lack a shareholder who owns even thirty-five percent of outstanding shares. Id. at 848. 
Because we are not arguing that the mediating hierarchy model is the only contracting solution to team 
production (only that it is a very important one in many of the largest firms) this analysis is 
illuminating but by no means fatal. Coates also suggests that many U.S. public firms are not well 
described as having mediating boards because a majority of the board is made up of “insiders” who 
also serve as managers, or outsiders who are as a practical matter “dominated” by insiders. Id. at 844. 
We regard such firms, however, as still falling within the mediating hierarchy model. Once directors 
are elected they enjoy the power to shift resources from managers to shareholders. They may very well 
exercise this power if existing management is performing poorly and internalized norms of fiduciary 
behavior suggest they should. The high level of turnover in executive suites in the last decade, see 
infra text accompanying note 55, suggests directors will, indeed, take actions against existing 
management if they believe that shareholders are being treated so shabbily they are likely to exit the 
corporate “team”, perhaps by selling into a takeover offer. See infra text accompanying note 91. Thus, 
while the fact that a majority of the board has ties to management likely allows managers to capture a 
larger share of the team’s surplus than another arrangement might, it does not make team production 
analysis inapplicable. 
 87. In a recent working paper, Alan Meese critiques the mediating hierarch model on the grounds 
that directors cannot play such a role easily in a closely held firm, and that closely held firms involve 
at least as much firm-specific investment as public companies. Meese, supra note 71. Although we 
agree with both of these propositions, we disagree with Meese’s conclusion that they somehow 
undermine the mediating hierarchy model. As our discussion in the text explores, closely held firms 
can and likely do rely on other arrangements to protect firm-specific investment. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07 (discussing altruism and trust). 
 89. See supra text and note 78 (discussing voting rights). 
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proxy battle. Moreover, the directors are empowered to set the date and the 
agenda for shareholder voting, and to propose their own slate of nominees, 
usually themselves, for the board. The net result is that, as a practical matter, 
the casting of shareholder votes in most public corporations is a meaningless 
rite.90 
There is an important caveat to this last observation. Shareholder voting 
can play an important role in determining who controls the corporation when 
a takeover bid is launched by an organized, wealthy, and dedicated suitor. 
Such a bidder might persuade the target firm’s shareholders to sell voting 
control in a tender offer, or to oust their present directors in a proxy battle, by 
tempting them with the opportunity to sell their shares at a hefty premium. A 
full discussion of the intricacies of corporate takeovers lies beyond the scope 
of our discussion. However, even commentators who believe that the market 
for corporate control significantly constrains directors acknowledge that 
hostile takeovers—whether attempted through tender offers or proxy 
battles—are difficult, risky, and expensive.91 Shareholders’ theoretical ability 
to “vote with their feet” in the market for corporate control thus seems likely 
to impose only a modest constraint on directors’ ability to serve as mediating 
hierarchs to the collection of residual claimants that make up “the firm.” 
D. The End Result is Director Autonomy 
Even this casual survey of U.S. corporate law reveals that the directors of 
public corporations enjoy remarkable discretion in deciding how corporate 
assets should be used and how corporate surpluses should be distributed. 
Should the firm close down a marginally profitable plant or keep it open in 
the interests of its employees and the local community? Should it retain 
earnings and build an empire for managers or should it use that money to pay 
out a hefty cash dividend to the shareholders? Should it increase its leverage 
and its return on equity or retain a comfortable cash cushion for the creditors? 
 
 
 90. Blair & Stout, supra note 3 (discussing limits on shareholder voting). See also CLARK, supra 
note 58, at 95 (noting that a cynic might conclude shareholder voting is “a fraud or a mere ceremony 
designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to managerial power”). These observations suggests a third 
possible explanation for shareholders’ voting rights: shareholder voting may be customary in public 
corporations for path dependence reasons. Large, publicly held corporations are a relatively recent 
innovation in economic history. Before the early twentieth century, most corporate activity took place 
in closely held firms in which shareholders were actively involved managers who could not readily sell 
their interests. At that time, shareholder voting played a key role in resolving intrashareholder 
conflicts. As the public corporation evolved, the practice of shareholder voting persisted, even as its 
importance as a governance tool declined.  
 91. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 56, at 850 (stating that “[a]dmittedly, the market for corporate 
control is ‘lumpy’ and expensive”). 
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It is the directors who ultimately decide. 
This is not to suggest that directors’ discretion is entirely unfettered. 
Although directors enjoy remarkable freedom from shareholders’ (or anyone 
else’s) direct control, they remain subject to equity market pressures. They 
may, for example, want to raise capital by selling stock to public investors, or 
their compensation may be tied to share price performance. In such 
situations, directors would have a special incentive to pay attention to 
shareholders’ interests in making their decisions.92 Nor do we intend to 
suggest that the board must, or should, ignore the shareholders’ wishes. 
Shareholders are essential members of the corporate “team”. But 
shareholders are not the only valuable team members who have a residual 
claim on the firm and whose interests thus need protection. Just as directors 
are free to listen (if not always to respond) to the shareholders’ wishes, they 
are free to listen (if not always to respond) to the wishes of creditors, top 
executives, and rank and file employees.93 Similarly, just as directors need to 
worry about equity market pressures, they need to worry about the pressures 
of other markets, including credit and employment markets. 
Still, there remains enough “play in the joints” to allow directors to favor 
one corporate constituency’s interests over another’s to a significant extent in 
many situations, without fear of serious consequences.94 So long as the 
 
 
 92. It should be noted that seasoned equity issuances by public corporations are relatively rare, 
and many other sources of capital are available. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being 
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
613, 644-50 (1988) (discussing the relative unimportance of equity issues as a source of corporate 
capital). 
 93. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have suggested that the team production model is 
one of several “reformulations of the manager-oriented model,” see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra 
note 3, at 448, which, in turn, is a “failure”. See id. at 443. Because we believe U.S. corporate law 
leaves directors of public firms just as free from top executives’ control as they are from shareholders’, 
we believe it is inaccurate to describe the mediating hierarchy model as managerialism. We also note 
the lack of rigorous evidence that the managerial model is a failure, except for the single observation 
cited by Hansmann and Kraakman that corporations in common law jurisdictions (primarily the United 
States and other English-speaking countries) have performed better in general than corporations in 
other countries in recent years. Id. at 450. Since we do not agree that U.S. corporations actually 
operate in a legal environment that enforces shareholder primacy, see supra text accompanying notes 
48-91, we do not view this observation as evidence for the proposition. 
 94. See Millon, supra note 71, at 1003 (noting that corporate law may allow “enough ‘play in the 
joints’ to accommodate a board that seeks to act as mediator”). Millon goes on to critique the 
mediating hierarch model on the grounds that nonshareholder groups are not completely protected by 
legal rules that give directors this much discretion. See id. at 1003-04 (noting that while directors are 
free to act as mediators, corporate law “does not mandate that vision and is equally capable of 
accepting director commitment to shareholder wealth maximization”). See also Meese, supra note 71. 
We agree. The specific investments of managers, employees, creditors, and other nonshareholder 
participants are not absolutely protected by mediating directors, just as shareholder claims are not 
absolutely protected by this arrangement. We believe, however, that all the participants are more likely 
to work out allocations of risks, responsibilities, and returns that are mutually acceptable if none is 
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directors provide enough of the firm’s surplus to each residual claimant to 
keep her in the corporate team (the shareholders receive enough dividends, 
the employees enough raises, the managers enough perks and prestige, and 
the creditors enough downside protection), team production can take place 
and can produce a surplus. Beyond this minimum requirement, who gets 
exactly what share of that surplus will be determined by which groups best 
capture the board’s attention, which groups argue most persuasively, and, 
perhaps, by what the directors had for breakfast the morning of the board 
meeting. 
As a solution to the contracting problems associated with team 
production, the mediating board is obviously messy. It does not, for example, 
provide directors with a simple goal and an easily observed measure of 
success (for example, “raise the stock price”). Rather, the mediating 
hierarchy model recommends that directors try to maximize the economic 
value of all the firm’s assets—a difficult thing to gauge when some of these 
assets take the form of residual claims on job security, enhanced prestige, or 
safer credit. In addition, a mediating board is not the only possible solution to 
team production contracting. For example, in smaller ventures where the 
participants tend to know each other, interpersonal trust may act as an 
effective brake on shirking and rent-seeking. Similarly, team production can 
be encouraged by arranging it so that the managers of the company are also 
the shareholders, as commonly occurs in closely held firms. We believe, 
however, that the fact that the mediating board is so widely used in public 
firms is strong evidence that it has proved a useful “second best” solution in 
many business situations, especially when human capital and financial 
capital must come from different sources and when production requires 
inputs from hundreds if not thousands of individuals who are unknown to 
each other. 
The observation that the mediating board solution necessarily grants 
directors a wide range of discretion in how to use corporate assets, and that 
an outside observer may have difficulty in determining how well they do 
this,95 does, however, raise an important question. What makes directors do 
their job well? What ensures that directors will actually mediate among 
corporate participants rather than capitulate to one constituency or another, or 
worse, abscond with corporate assets themselves? 
 
 
allowed to retain the power that direct “ownership” of and control over the corporation’s assets and 
resulting profits would give them. Thus, by placing ultimate decision-making authority over corporate 
assets in directors’ hands (rather than, say, the hands of managers or large-block shareholders), 
corporate law facilitates team production. 
 95. See supra text and note 35 (discussing the problem of verifiability in team production). 
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In this section we have already suggested some answers to this inquiry.96 
For example, it is clearly important to prevent directors from using the firm’s 
assets to line their own pockets, and the duty of loyalty addresses this 
problem. Beyond this basic limit, however, the nature of team production 
makes it almost impossible to develop a legally enforceable substantive 
standard for the mediating board. The mediating hierarchy model suggests 
that directors must be accountable to all the firm’s residual claimants. 
Moreover, directors are accountable for maximizing the total value of the 
residual claimants’ interests in the firm. But because the inputs and outputs of 
team production are to some extent unverifiable—meaning they cannot be 
readily identified and measured by an outside party such as a court—there is 
no way to set a substantive judicial standard for gauging how good a job the 
board is doing. 
Instead, the best the law can do is to set procedural standards that 
discourage director haste and ignorance that would put all the firm’s residual 
claimants at risk.97 Disclosure rules, such as those imposed on the boards of 
public firms under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,98 may also play a 
useful role. Accurate, audited disclosure is valuable to all the firm’s residual 
claimants, as it not only helps to police against director loyalty violations but 
also helps each group of corporate participants to gauge whether they are 
receiving a fair share of the firm’s surplus. Is the firm making record profits? 
Perhaps the union ought to press for a wage increase. Are earnings down? 
Perhaps the shareholders ought to present the directors with a proposal to 
limit executive compensation. In fact, under the mediating hierarchy model, 
strong arguments can be made that we ought to expand our existing 
disclosure scheme to require firms to accumulate and disclose information 
relevant to corporate participant’s nonfinancial claims, such as information 
about employee turnover or job satisfaction survey results.99 
But while setting procedural requirements for directors can contribute to 
board accountability, procedural requirements alone are not enough. If 
directors are rationally selfish actors concerned only with their own welfare, 
imposing procedural standards may only cause them to jump mindlessly 
through the appropriate procedural hoops, rather than motivating them to
 
 
 96. See supra text and notes 62-66 (discussing the duty of loyalty). 
 97. See infra text accompanying note 115. 
 98. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk (2000). 
 99. A recently published report of a special Brookings Institution task force proposes that 
corporate disclosure rules should be expanded to include many nonfinancial performance measures. 
See Blair & Wallman, supra note 30. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
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actually do a good job. So we turn next to the question of what else might 
promote director accountability. 
VI. DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ROLE OF INTRINSIC 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
One of the most often repeated arguments raised in favor of shareholder 
primacy is that if directors and managers are not held accountable to a single 
constituency, and their performance is not judged by a single, verifiable, and 
objective metric, they will be accountable for nothing and to no one. Too 
much discretion, it is argued, leads at best to sloppy management. At worst, it 
leads to self-serving “empire building,” corporate waste, or even 
misappropriation of corporate resources.100 
As noted earlier, even while directors enjoy enormous legal discretion in 
how they choose to manage and allocate corporate resources, as a practical 
matter this discretion is limited somewhat by economic pressures, such as the 
cost of capital, the availability of skilled workers, and the demand for the 
firm’s products.101 These sorts of constraints may well have more effect on 
the day-to-day decisions of most directors than legal constraints do. There is, 
however, another possible important curb on director behavior. Although 
often overlooked or discounted in economic analyses of corporate behavior 
and corporate law, we believe it may be critical to a full understanding of the 
role corporate directors play. This constraint is directors’ internalized belief 
that they ought to behave in a careful, loyal, and trustworthy fashion.  
Contractarian corporate analysis, like most economic analysis, generally 
assumes that the best way to model human behavior is to presume that 
people are rationally selfish actors. Thus shareholders, creditors, managers, 
and (most relevant for our purposes) directors are assumed to be utterly 
indifferent to the effects their actions have on others. Were this actually true, 
however, the public corporation likely would never have evolved as a 
successful business form. Given the difficulties associated with trying to 
bridle directors through shareholder voting and/or derivative suits, rational 
shareholders, creditors, managers, and employees would never give up 
control over trillions of dollars of financial capital and trillions more in 
specific human capital and implicit contract claims to nakedly selfish boards. 
The social institution of a board of directors rests on the implicit assumption 
that at least some people, to some extent, some of the time, are capable of 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 439-43. See also Victor Brudney, The 
Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. 
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looking out for the interests of others—even when they reap no direct 
economic benefit from doing so.102 Indeed, this assumption underlies most 
fiduciary relationships.103  
Economists accustomed to employing automatically the homo 
economicus model of human behavior may be uncomfortable with relying on 
the idea that people sometimes are willing to serve others without direct 
reward. Yet most people—and certainly most business people—recognize at 
least intuitively that individuals often can be counted upon to “do the right 
thing.” This is not to say self-interest is unimportant. To the contrary, in the 
right circumstances most of us are fully capable of acting in a purely selfish 
fashion. But under other circumstances, most of us also are capable of 
kindness, consideration, charity, loyalty, and faithfulness. To use economists’ 
parlance, people’s behavior sometimes “reveals a preference” for taking 
account of others’ interests in making decisions.104  
For cynics who doubt this, in a recent joint article we surveyed some of 
the extensive empirical evidence that psychologists, sociologists, and other 
social scientists produced on one form of other-regarding revealed 
preference—trustworthy behavior.105 This evidence establishes two 
propositions beyond any reasonable empirical challenge. First, trustworthy 
behavior occurs. Most people are quite capable of choosing to make some 
 
 
 102. This may be most obvious in the case of a nonprofit board, but for reasons discussed earlier it 
also is for many for-profit boards as well. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (discussing 
director autonomy).  
 103. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 545-48 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. . . . [A 
fiduciary puts] himself in a position in which thought of self [is] to be renounced, however hard the 
abnegation.”). Fiduciary relationships are premised on some degree of altruism because, while the 
fiduciary may be paid a fee for her services, that payment usually is not contingent on any objective 
performance measure. Thus, the fiduciary has little extrinsic motivation to exert effort on the 
beneficiary’s behalf. 
 104. It can be argued that altruism driven by internalized punishments, such as guilt, is in a sense 
consistent with self-interest. This may be true. From an economic perspective, however, if such 
internal motivations induce altruistic behavior when extrinsic incentives do not support it, the end 
result is a “revealed preference” for other-regarding behavior. 
 105. See Blair & Stout, supra note 7.  In this Article, we define “trustworthiness” as an 
internalized belief that one should not exploit another’s vulnerability, that, in turn, makes others 
willing to make themselves vulnerable. The mediating hierarchy model relies on trustworthy behavior 
by directors, because it predicts that corporate participants will agree to make themselves mutually 
vulnerable by giving the hierarch control of their firm-specific investments. 
 Alternative forms of other-regarding behavior may include pure generosity (distinguished from 
trustworthiness because the recipient does not change her position in reliance upon the expectation of 
altruism) and vengeance (a willingness to incur a personal cost in order to punish another). See 
generally Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms (2001) (working paper, on 
file with author). 
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degree of personal sacrifice to benefit others.106 Second, this behavior is not 
quirky or unpredictable. To the contrary, people can be counted upon with 
some reliability to behave in a trustworthy fashion when the economic and 
social conditions are favorable.107 
When are the economic and social conditions “favorable”? Social 
scientists have devoted enormous energy in recent years trying to determine 
exactly what sorts of factors and variables are likely to elicit fair, honorable, 
and trustworthy behavior. This effort has generated considerable formal 
knowledge about what circumstances are likely to trigger altruism and what 
circumstances trigger selfishness.108 A full discussion of the determinants of 
other-regarding behavior lies beyond the scope of our argument, as does a 
full discussion of how other-regarding behavior relates to corporate law. But 
some basic lessons can be drawn from the empirical literature that may be of 
great value in understanding what motivates and influences corporate 
directors. 
A. Determinants of Trustworthy Behavior  
Let us focus first on the role played by social variables in eliciting 
trustworthy behavior. In a wide variety of experiments designed to test 
people’s willingness to provide benefits to others (or to refrain from 
imposing costs on them), social scientists have found that the decision to 
behave in an other-regarding fashion is remarkably sensitive to social 
context—meaning the subjects’ perceptions of others’ beliefs, expectations, 
likely actions, and relationships to themselves. For example, in “social 
dilemma” games where subjects are asked to choose between a cooperative 
strategy that maximizes the group’s payoff and a noncooperative strategy 
that maximizes their personal payoffs, experimenters have found that by 
manipulating social context they can produce everything from nearly 
universal cooperation to an almost absolute absence of cooperation—even 
though a purely selfish subject would always choose noncooperation.109 
Three social variables in particular appear to play powerful roles in 
determining when people behave selfishly and when they behave more 
cooperatively. The first variable is instructions from authority. Studies have 
 
 
 106. See Blair & Stout, supra note 7, at 1764-66.  
 107. Id. at 1768-75 
 108. Id.  
 109. See Blair & Stout, supra note 7, at 1768. This implies that most people behave as if they have 
two revealed preference functions. One is competitive and self-regarding; the other is cooperative and 
other-regarding. Social context largely determines when the cooperative preference function 
dominates. Id. at 1761-62. 
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found that subjects in experimental games behave far more altruistically 
toward their fellow players when the experimenter tells them, or even hints to 
them, that they should do this, even though such instructions do not change 
the players’ economic incentives.110 Second, other-regarding behavior 
depends on perceptions of group identity. Subjects are more likely to 
cooperate with other players when they perceive them as belonging to a 
common “in-group” than when they perceive the other players as belonging 
to an “out-group.”111 Finally, altruism appears to be influenced by herd 
behavior. When a subject believes others are behaving altruistically, she is 
more likely to behave altruistically herself.112  
While such social factors play highly influential roles in determining the 
incidence of trustworthy behavior, economic factors are not unimportant. 
Studies find that, when the social conditions are right, experimental subjects 
will incur a personal sacrifice to behave altruistically. But as the personal 
cost associated with benefitting others rises, the degree of altruism observed 
begins to decline.113 In other words, the supply of trustworthy behavior as a 
function of the cost of behaving trustworthily may be “downward sloping.” 
As the personal cost associated with trustworthiness rises, the degree of 
trustworthy behavior observed declines.114 
B. Encouraging Director Trustworthiness 
These findings offer a variety of insights into the problem of how to 
motivate corporate directors to better serve the interests of the coalition of 
corporate participants that makes up the firm. Perhaps most obviously, the 
findings underscore the importance of the director’s duty of loyalty. An 
enforceable duty of loyalty rule can punish a director who employs her 
corporate power for her own benefit (or, at least, for her own pecuniary 
benefit). As a result, the duty of loyalty encourages altruistic behavior by 
reducing its relative personal cost. In effect, a director might say to herself, 
 
 
 110. See id. at 1769-70. 
 111. See id. at 1770-72. 
 112. See id. at 1772-73. 
 113. See id. at 1773-75. For example, one regression analysis found that doubling the reward from 
defecting in a social dilemma decreased cooperation rates by as much as sixteen percent. Id. at 1774. 
 114. This raises the question: If trustworthiness only appears when it is not too costly, how can it 
be a source of significant social gains? One answer to this question is that trustworthy acts requiring 
only a modest sacrifice on the part of the trusted actor can produce much larger gains for the trusting 
actor. In the case of corporate directors, such situations may arise with some frequency. For example, a 
marginal increase in the degree of care exercised by a corporate board will greatly benefit the firm 
when it prevents the loss or destruction of a valuable corporate asset. See id. at 1774-75 (discussing 
other answers to this question).  
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“Since I can’t use my position to make myself better off, I might as well use 
it to make others better off.” In contrast, a toothless duty of loyalty 
discourages director trustworthiness by offering directors the tempting 
opportunity to use their control over corporate assets to increase their own 
wealth at the expense of the firm. 
Imposing purely procedural requirements on directors similarly can 
encourage good corporate governance. The argument goes as follows: under 
the business judgment rule, courts refuse to second-guess the substantive 
wisdom of directors’ decisions. Instead, the rule merely requires directors to 
make their decisions in an informed and deliberate manner. But once 
directors have gone to the trouble of informing themselves, taking the next 
step—actually thinking about what they have learned—does not require 
much additional effort. Thus procedural rules also can encourage greater 
director care by reducing the marginal personal cost of taking care.115 
The empirical evidence suggests that directors can be further encouraged 
to behave trustworthily by employing a variety of “soft” social variables.116 
One of the most obvious may be the dicta of judicial opinions. As noted 
earlier, experimental subjects are far more likely to behave altruistically 
when they are instructed to do so by the experimenter.117 In the context of 
corporate law, courts may enjoy a parallel position of influence and 
authority. If so, judicial pronouncements that directors ought to behave in a 
trustworthy (careful and loyal) fashion probably influence behavior even in 
the absence of legal sanctions.118 Similarly, directors who perceive 
themselves as sharing in-group status with the firm’s employees, managers, 
and shareholders, will be more likely to behave trustworthily with respect to 
these groups than directors who do not. Finally, directors who believe that 
other directors are behaving trustworthily will be more likely to do the same. 
In other words, there are a wide variety of social signals and cues 
available to encourage directors of public corporations to be “accountable” to 
 
 
 115. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of  
Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 95 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.  
 117. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
 118. A related argument has been offered by Edward Rock, who argues that judicial opinions on 
the duty of care may influence director behavior not primarily through the threat of legal sanction, but 
by providing a “sermon” on what sort of behavior is normatively desirable. See generally Edward B. 
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 
(1997). While Rock acknowledges the possibility that directors may internalize such “norms”, 
however, his analysis rests primarily on his claim that judicial norms are enforced through nonlegal, 
external punishments such as social disapproval and lost opportunities to sit on other boards. For a 
variety of reasons, we think internalized beliefs may be at least as important as such external factors. 
See Blair & Stout, supra note 7, at 1794-96 (discussing reasons).  
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the firm, even when the available external rewards and punishments seem to 
give little incentive for accountability. This behavioral reality gives hope to 
those who bemoan directors’ apparent lack of accountability by suggesting 
why, even in the absence of observable carrots and sticks, directors will often 
try to do the right thing in the boardroom. Further, it suggests the value that 
can be gained from modifying the homo economicus approach to the 
question of director accountability to take account of intrinsic trustworthiness 
and other actualities of human nature.119 
C. On the Dangers of Shareholder Primacy Rhetoric 
Finally, our analysis also hints at the potential dangers of 
overemphasizing the principle-agent model and the rhetoric of shareholder 
primacy. In recent years, the claim that corporate executives need stronger 
motivations to raise share price has been used to justify astoundingly large 
compensation packages for corporate executives in the form of incentive 
stock options.120 More recently, academics and commentators have begun to 
argue that directors, too, should be paid in stock.121 But the observation that 
trustworthy behavior only tends to flourish in circumstances where the cost 
of such behavior is low presents a challenge to these trends.  
Traditionally, corporate directors received a fixed annual fee, and often a 
relatively modest one at that, for their services.122 If this system of 
compensation did not exactly spur them to employ maximum effort as 
mediating hierarchs, it gave them no incentive to do otherwise. Director 
compensation systems that tie director pay to stock price performance, 
however, may introduce conflicts of interest that make it much more difficult 
for directors credibly to play a mediating role. 
The rise of the shareholder primacy model may also undermine directors’ 
ability to serve as mediating hierarchs in a second fashion—by changing the 
social context in which the board operates. We explored above how judicial 
dicta may be an important determinant of director behavior.123 When courts 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 787 (2001).  
 120. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990. See also G. Bennett Stewart III, Remaking the Public 
Corporation From Within, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1990. 
 121. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management—Capital Board—
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996). See also Charles M. Elson, The 
Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1995). 
 122. See CLARK, supra note 58, at 108-09 (noting that directors typically receive a flat fee 
unrelated to their performance). 
 123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
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tell directors to serve the firm, and make it clear that “the firm” is not 
synonymous with “the shareholders,” directors will be more likely to take 
account of other corporate constituencies in making their decisions. 
Conversely, when courts tell directors to serve only the shareholders (or, 
more realistically, when corporate attorneys trained by law professors who 
favor the principal-agent model tell directors they should only serve the 
shareholders) directors are more likely to feel they ought to do this. 
Similarly, when corporate scholars and the business press repeatedly assert 
that shareholders “own” the firm and that the directors are merely the 
shareholders’ “agents”, directors are likely to define the corporate in-group to 
whom they owe loyalty as including only the shareholders. Directors are also 
likely to suspect that other directors at other companies are single-mindedly 
pursuing high share prices, and therefore they ought to do the same. 
The bottom line is that scholars, lawmakers, and businesspeople who are 
willing to adopt a more nuanced model of human behavior that incorporates 
the empirical phenomenon of intrinsic trustworthiness may be able to 
identify a variety of mechanisms for encouraging director accountability that 
ultimately could prove more effective than a crude “carrot-and-stick” 
approach emphasizing external incentives. In other words, there may be 
many more useful answers to the question of how directors can be made 
accountable than traditional contractarian analysis recognizes. This hopeful 
possibility only heightens the importance of finding the correct answers to 
the antecedent questions: to whom should directors be accountable, and for 
what?  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past few decades, a consensus emerged among most corporate 
scholars that the directors of a public corporation ought to run the firm with 
an eye to one goal only—maximizing the economic value of the 
stockholders’ shares within the confines of the law. Yet even as this 
shareholder primacy view has begun to gain traction outside of academia, 
more recent work in economics has begun to undermine it. The lessons of 
options theory and the reality of firm-specific investment counsel against 
assuming that directors of public firms ought to behave as shareholders’ 
agents. To the contrary, directors of public firms not only enjoy, but should 
enjoy, a remarkable degree of freedom from the commands of shareholders 
or, indeed, any other corporate constituency. This director autonomy 
amplifies agency cost problems by giving directors greater leeway to indulge 
in a variety of self-serving behaviors (most obviously, shirking). Because it 
also allows directors to act as mediating heirarchs, however, it may provide a 
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second best solution to the contracting difficulties associated with team 
production. 
Team production analysis thus suggests that one of the most important 
tasks that directors of public firms perform is a balancing act in which they 
pay attention and respond to the competing claims of a variety of important 
corporate constituencies. These constituencies include not only shareholders, 
but also creditors, managers, rank-and-file employees, and even the local 
community—essentially any group that bears significant risks or makes 
significant firm-specific investments. In juggling the competing demands and 
needs of these groups, directors are driven by one economic imperative: the 
need to keep the corporate team together and keep it productive. Provided 
they can do this, however, directors will retain and should retain the ultimate 
authority to decide who gets what share of the resulting corporate surplus. 
By emphasizing the importance of director autonomy, the team 
production model of the mediating board in many ways does a better job than 
the shareholder primacy model of explaining the way corporate law actually 
works. It is also in harmony with the way many directors view their own 
jobs. Although many corporate directors have come to accept shareholder 
primacy as their ultimate goal, many others view themselves as “brokers” or 
“referees” who must weigh the interests of the shareholders against those of 
other legitimate corporate constituencies, including employees, creditors, and 
customers.124 
Of course, in many circumstances, arguably most, it will be in the 
shareholders’ interest for the board to consider the needs of other 
constituencies in calculating what is best for the firm as a going concern. If a 
company expects to be a “repeat player” in a labor or credit market, it is not 
in the shareholders’ long-run interest for the firm to sully its repuation by 
ruthlessly taking advantage of creditors or employees. Thus shareholder 
primacy advocates might be tempted to claim that other corporate 
constituencies will automatically be protected in a shareholder primacy 
regime. Unfortunately, under a rule of strict shareholder primacy that bids the 
board of every firm to favor the interests of shareholders at every turn, this is 
not the case. While team production analysis suggests that shareholders as a 
class are better off if they “tie their own hands” by ceding control of the firm 
 
 
 124. See, e.g., Robert H. Campbell, Directors: ‘The Brokers of Balance,’ DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 
Summer 1996, at 45-47 (arguing that the “overriding challenge” facing directors is to strike “an 
appropriate balance between the seemingly conflicting needs of the stakeholders,” and describing 
directors as “brokers” and “referees”). See also J. Keith Louden, A Position Description for the Board, 
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1993, at 23.  
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to a mediating board,125 particular groups of shareholders in particular firms 
can still profit from opportunistic behavior. For example, investors who 
target specific companies and buy enough shares to elect a new board may, 
in certain situations, be able to renege on implicit understandings with other 
corporate participants, or to undertake highly risky strategies that benefit 
themselves at other participants’ expense.126 Thus policies that serve 
shareholders as a class do not always maximize the value of every investor’s 
shares. A simplistic allegiance to shareholder primacy that denies such a 
possibility, and insists that shareholders should have the right and the power 
to do whatever they want with “their” company, ultimately makes 
shareholders—as well as other corporate constituents—worse off. 
Careful analysis consequently highlights the danger associated with a 
simplistic rhetoric of shareholder primacy that treats the interests of “the 
shareholders” as synonymous with the interests of “the firm.” Nine times out 
of ten, corporate policies that serve the shareholders’ interest may serve the 
interests of other corporate constituents as well. It is important, however, for 
corporate directors to be able to recognize and respond to situations where 
this is not the case. Of course, this subtlety comes with a cost. The mediating 
board model replaces an easily measurable goal of good corporate 
governance (raise the price of the firm’s shares) with one that is far more 
complex and difficult for outsiders to observe (maximize the value of the 
firm as a whole). In the process, it emphasizes the importance of ensuring 
that mediating directors operate in an environment where both the economic 
and the social variables encourage them to behave trustworthily. 
 
 
 125. This benefit is recognized by sophisticated financial investors who often appreciate the need 
to accommodate and protect the interests of other corporate constituencies in order to protect their 
own, especially in industries where the contributions of nonfinancial participants play a key role.  In 
Britain, for example, a group of eight British institutional investors, together with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and BP Amoco,  agreed to call on U.K. companies to “manage effectively 
relationships with its employees, suppliers and customers, to behave ethically and to have regard for 
the environment and society as a whole.” Social Graces, GLOBAL PROXY WATCH, Jan. 26, 2001. 
Hermes Investment Management revised its corporate governance policies to reflect this new approach 
and asked companies to both disclose their policies in these areas annually and to have a credible 
system in place for verifying the accuracy of these disclosures. Id. Hermes Investment Management 
has also asked that compensation committees on boards “consider the effect on the company’s 
performance of social, environmental and ethical matters” as part of its remuneration decisions. Id. 
The other institutions in the group are expected to adopt the language too. Id. For institutional 
investors who are widely diversified, these sorts of corporate governance policies clearly make sense 
as a means of encouraging nonshareholder groups to make specific investments in team production.  
 126. For example, one study suggested that the apparent economic gains enjoyed by shareholders 
in Carl Icahn’s takeover of Trans World Airlines (TWA) all came from the lost wages of the airline’s 
employees. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-56 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).  
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The result may be a messy, second best solution to the contracting 
problems associated with economic production in public corporations. It is a 
solution, however, that has stood the test of time. The “separation of 
ownership and control” remains a basic characteristic of the U.S. public 
corporation, although Professors Berle and Means first complained of it in 
the 1930s.127 Nevertheless, the public corporation survives and thrives. In 
light of this reality, as well as the lessons of the contemporary economic and 
other social sciences literature, we should hesitate before concluding that the 
mediating board of directors is a broken institution that needs fixing. 
 
 
 127. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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